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Summary findings
McCarthy and Zanalda study the economic performance  stimulating exports and tourism. The buildup of debt
of ten Caribbean islands from 1980 to 1992. They study  created problems for some of the governments later in the
the islands in two groups: six small islands from the  decade, resulting in the need for strong contractionary
Organization  of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and  measures.
four larger islands: Barbados, Dominican Republic,  But the difference in performance berween islands
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.  cannot be explained by external shocks alone.
These islands  all experienced significant economic  The OECS group achieved superior performance even
problems in 1980-92, but the OECS group did remarkably  though they faced roughly the same shocks as the larger
well (averaging  an annual GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent)  islands. It helped that they had a monetary board that
while the larger islands  grew at only 0.7 percent a year.  encouraged high investment levels. But this was
Why?  complemented by concessionary flows used productively
McCarthy and Zanalda compute external shocks  and by foreign direct investment.
together with each island's performance response to them.  Now the question is how well these economies will
Some islands resorted inordinately to external financing to  fare when they face the inevitable reduction in
cope with adverse shocks. Others tried to compensate by  concessionary flows in coming years.
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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the performance  of ten islands in the Caribbean area over the
period 1980-92. The islands are divided into two groups, six from the Organization of  Eastem
Caribbean States (OECS) and a second group composed  of four larger islands, Barbados, Dominican
Republic,  Jamaica  and Trinidad and Tobago.
These islands all  experienced significant economic problems  during  this period.
However the OECS group did remarkably well and averaged an annual GDP growth rate of 5.2
percent while the corresponding  figure for larger islands  was only 0.7 percent. The question  is why?
For each island  the external  shocks together with the performance  response  to them are
computed. It is noted that some resorted inordinately  to external financing when faced with adverse
shocks. Others sought to compensate  by stimulating  exports and tourism. The buildup of debt created
problems for some of the govermnents later in the decade  and resulted in  the need for strong
contractionary  measures. However the difference  in performance  between islands cannot be explained
by external shocks  alone.
In a broader context it seems that the OECS group did achieve  a superior performance
even though they were faced by roughly similar shocks to the other group. This was helped by having
a monetary  board  which was conducive  to high investment  levels. However this was complemented  by
concessionary  flows used in a productive  manner and by foreign  direct investments.
A more pressing question is how well these economies will fare when they face a
seemingly  inevitable  reduction  in the availability  of concessionary  flows in the coming years.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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and Steve Webb for their many inputs. Editorial assistance was provided by Milagros Divino and
Joanne Lee.I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  The Caribbean area is composed  of a number of relatively small islands with similar
characteristics  but also a remarkable  range of diversity in terms of their socio-political  arrangements,
resource endowments  and economic  structures. Domestic  markets are small and most islands are not
well endowed with resources-Trinidad is the only oil exporter in the group. Generally export bases
have been narrow and heavily dependent on a  few commodities  such as sugar, bananas, nutmeg,
bauxite. Most of the islands have relied on preferential  trade arrangements  for their main exports. This
access has certain advantages but it has also helped foster a level of competition in  a number of
industries below what might have resulted in a more open market situation. Historically there has
always been a certain amount of tourism  in the area and more recently  most of the islands have sought
to expand  in this area and also diversify into other service industries.
2.  This paper considers the performance  of ten of these islands divided into two groups
over the period 1980-1992.  Selected  economic  characteristics  are presented  in Tables 1 and 2. The first
group, hereafter called OECS 1,  is composed  of six small islands, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica,
2 Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  The second group
aggregates  four bigger islands, Barbados,  Dominican  Republic,  Jamaica  and Trinidad and Tobago. 3 All
these countries, except Dominican  Republic, are part of the Caribbean Community  (CARICOM).4  To a
casual observer the OECS countries in the period under analysis  achieved  far superior growth rates to
most of the countries in the second group. The question is why?  Were they particularly lucky in the
external environment  or was it their domestic  policy or institutional  arrangements?  5
3.  Some of the islands achieved independence  in the 1960s, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago in 1962, Barbados  and Guyana in 1966. The small islands of the Eastern Caribbean attained
I  Organization  of the Eastern  Caribbean  States  (OECS).  The  United  Kingdom  dependency  Montserrat  and
Anguilla  are also  members  of the  OECS.
2  Hereafter,  Antigua  refers  to Antigua  and  Barbuda,  St. Kitts  to St. Kitts  and Nevis,  St. Vincent  to St. Vincent
and  the  Grenadines,  Trinidad  to Trinidad  and  Tobago.
3  Available  data  for Belize  and  Guyana  were  not sufficient  to compute  external  shocks  and performance
measures  for the  period  under  review.  Therefore  we  had to exclude  these  two  countries  from  our analysis.
4  CARICOM  consists  also  of the  following  countries  and  UK  dependencies:  the Bahamas,  Belize,  Guyana,
Anguilla,  Cayman  Islands,  Montserrat,  Turks  and  Caicos  Islands,  British  Virgin  Islands.
5  Some  of the OECS  institutional  characteristics  are  presented  in Appendix  1.2
Table 1: GNP  per Capita,  Population  and Trade
GNP  per  capita  Populabon  Xc  Trade/Output  %d  Currency  Board
1993  I  a  1980-92i1918  19  19S-2  I
Antigua  and Barbuda  6,390  5.0  6B,569  176.1  169.2  170.7  yes,  ECCBV
Dominica  2,680  4.6  72.265  119.1  126.4  120.0  yes, ECCBV
Grenada  2,410  3.8  91,000  132.0  107.2  121.5  yes, ECCB  V
St Kitb and  Nevis  4,470  5.7  41,380  169.8  148.2  149.8  yes,  ECCB  V
St Lucia  3,040  4.4  157,600  165.0  182.8  147.7  yes,  ECCB  V
St.  Vincent  and the  Grenadines  2,130  5.0  109,700  172.5  131.5  153.1  yes,  ECCBV
OTHERS
Barbados  6,240  1.0  259.700  138.6  96.5  116.3
Dominican  Republic  1,080  -0.5  7,447,000  42.8  55.6  55.6
Jamaica  1,390  0.2  2,415,000  106.9  149.9  113.3
Trinidad  and  Tobago  3,730  -2.6  1,282,000  136.2  82.0  85.9
a.  Atlas  methodology.  Current  USS.  World  Bank,  STARS.
b. Percent  Average  annual  real  growth  rate.  St.Lucia  and Grenada  1980-93.  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1994.
c. World  Bank,  STARS.
d. Percent.  Imports  and  exports  of goods  and nonfactor  services  in U.S.  dollars  as  a rabo  of GDP.  at market  prices.  World  Bank  STARS.
e. Percent  Perod average.
f. Eastem  Caribbean  Central  Bank
Table 2:  Average Sectoral Growth Rates, 1980-90
Agriculture  Industry  (Manufactunng)  Tourism  and Services
QEC
Antigua  and Barbuda  -0.5  7.5  (4.6)  6.6
Dominica  4.8  4.3  (6.9)  4.4
Grenada  1.5  8.2  (7.5)  4.6
St.Kitts  and Nevis  -2.8  4.5  (-1.1)  7.3
St. Lucia  6.6  7.0  (7.4)  6.8
St Vincent  and  the Grenadines  10.4  5.0  (3.8)  6.0
OTHERS
Barbados  -2.5  0.5  (-0.8)  1.5
Dominican  Republic  0.6  1.1  (0.5)  2.5
Jamarica  -0.5  2.1  (2.4)  1.2
Trinidad  and Tobago  -4.1  -6.2  (-942)  -2.1
Source:  World  Bank  (1994a),  p.9.3
their independence  in the late 1970s  and early 1980s.  Even though trade shares were quite large during
the seventies, it was only in the early eighties that most of the countries began to dismantle much of
the trading restrictions. Today there is a general agreement  on the need for openness  to the rest of the
world. This is particularly important for providing access to new technology and ideas together with
access to  larger markets. As the economies become increasingly  open they stand to gain from the
opportunities  in the global market but at the same  time they become more exposed to the variability of
the external  world. At this juncture global trading arrangements  such as the completion  of the Uruguay
Round and NAFTA are introducing  major challenges  for policy-makers  in this area. OECS countries in
particular, given the uncertainty  of the new banana regime in the European Union, are going to be less
6 protected from changes  in the world economy.
4.  The  external environment plays  an  extremely important role  in  determining the
economic  progress, or lack thereof, throughout  this area. Historically, the Caribbean economies  have
been exposed to a variety of external shocks. In recent years there has been an increasing tendency
towards globalization  of trade, services  and capital  flows. This has brought into sharper focus the issue
of external shocks and how to deal with them.  Generally  when shocks are unfavorable, authorities  in
these countries treated them as temporary in  the sense that they relied often heavily on external
financing  but when shocks turned favorable  they did not seek to reduce external  indebtedness.
5.  In doing this analysis one is limited by available  data sources. Given the size of some
of these countries it is inevitable  that the resources available  for gathering data is somewhat  limited so
it is important to bear this caveat in mind. In the following  section an analysis of the main external
shocks is presented  while Section  III discusses  the responses  to them. The main purpose of such study
is to offer some insights on explaining  how these economies  fared, and may be useful for analysis in
the future on how to deal with these problems.
6.  Section IV provides a brief overview of economic performances during the period
1980-92. It considers investment,  savings, inflation, exchange  rate, and the role of external resources.
An interesting point is that the OECS countries have a monetary  board so one is tempted to draw
6  The  cost and  the  inefficiency  of the new  European  Union's  banana  scheme  are  analyzed  in Borrell  (1994).4
some conclusions  as to whether  this played a pivotal role in their seemingly  better growth performance
during  this  period.  Section V provides some insight on  this  issue. However, there  are  other
considerations  that  seem  to have been relevant  such as access  to concessionary  finance and the level of
investment.  Further details are given on a country by country  basis in Appendix 1.
II.  EXTERNAL  SHOCKS
7.  There is an extensive  literature on whether open economies  are better at handling the
impact of external shocks. Balassa (1981) argued that openness to trade was positively related to
economic performance. Sachs (1985) compared the economic performance  of  newly industrializing
countries in East Asia and the economies  of Latin America  when faced with similar shocks. He argued
that the superior performance of the  former was due  to  greater export orientation but  he  also
emphasized  the role of a political culture more in tune with maintaining  competitiveness.  More recently
Edwards (1993) in his study of Latin American  countries investigated  the interaction between trade,
policy and productivity  growth. He found that countries  that were more open to the rest of the world
have experienced  faster growth in total productivity  than countries  with high trade barriers. Thus while
most of the islands have reduced distortions and moved towards freer trading regimes the overall
economic  performance  has not shown a uniformly  dramatic improvement.  Some of the explanation  for
this may be found in analyzing  the external shocks  they experienced  and in particular the performance
response  to them.
8.  The analytical  approach adopted  in this paper is an extension of some earlier work by
Balassa and more recently by McCarthy, Neary, Zanalda (1994). The basis of this approach is to
construct a counterfactual  which seeks to generate what may be construed as normal for the external
environment. In this analysis, based on the methodology  presented in Appendix 2, the impact of the
external environment is  assessed by  considering four direct and one  indirect shocks. These are
measured by  the terms of trade effect, nonfactor services effect, export volume effect and  the
international  interest rate effect. The indirect shock is the cumulative  impact of net external borrowing
resulting from the policies adopted  in response  to previous  shocks. While the four direct shocks are5
Table 3: Extemal  Shocks  as a percent  of GDP
(Positive  values  correspond  to unfavorable  shodcs)
(annual  average  over  corresponding  period)
1980-86  1987-92  1980-92  1980-8  1987-92  1980-92
Tens  of Trade  Effet
Antigua  0.78  2.58  1.59  Barbados  0.98  1.31  1.14
Dominica  2.37  2.79  2.56  Dominican  Republic  0.45  0.71  0.57
Grenada  1.13  3.30  2.13  Jamace  0.00  1.29  0.59
St.  KIl  and  Nevis  0.76  3.03  1.80  Trnidad  and  Tobago  0.97  -0.85  0.13
St.Lucla  1.28  2.35  1.77
St Vincent  2.30  2.01  2.17
eontactor  Service  Effer
Anrgu  -0.07  -2.31  -1.10  Babados  -0.30  -1.18  -0.70
Dominica  0.03  0.11  0.06  . Dominicn  Repubflc  0.15  -0.43  -0.12
Grnda  -0.21  -0.65  -0.41  Jamasc  0.15  -0.41  -0.11
St Kitt and  Nevis  -0.02  -0.58  -0.28  Trdad  and  Tobago  0.02  0.06  0.05
St.Luca  -0.12  -0.83  -0.36
St. Vincent  -0.20  -0.13  -0.17
Export  Volume  Efec:t
Antlgus  0.37  -0.08  0.16  aados  0.11  -0.17  -0.02
Doini  0.22  -0.47  -0.10  Dominican  Republic  0.13  -0.22  -.03
Grend  0.26  -0.29  0.00  Jamaica  0.37  -0.24  0.09
St. Kra  nd  Nevi  0.49  -0.31  0.12  Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.65  -0.44  0.15
SLLucha  0.25  -0.38  -0.04
St Vcnt  0.23  .58  -0.15
Addional  Debt  Servic
Antigua  1.07  1.41  1.22  Babados  0.23  0.29  026
Dombni  2.74  1.62  2.23  Dominican  Repubc  0.55  0.89  0.71
Grenada  0.62  0.72  0.66  Jamaica  2.40  2.78  2.57
St.  Klsttend Nvis  1.55  2.22  1.88  TrWdladandTobago  0.09  1.03  0.52
St.Luci  0.79  0.88  0.74
St. Vhcnt  -0.22  -0.54  -0.37
Intest  Rate Effect
Antigua  0.00  0.00  0.00  Bafbados  -0.07  40.04  -0.06
Dominica  0.00  0.00  Dominican  Republic  -0.11  -0.08  -0.10
Grenada  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  Jamaica  -0.22  -0.14  -0.18
St. Kitt and Nevls  0.00  0.00  0.00  Trinidad  *nd Tobago  -0.05  -0.13  -0.09
StLLucia  0.00  0.00  0.00
St. Vnexnt  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total Shocks"
Antigua  2.13  1.58  1.88  Bafbados  0.98  0.21  0.62
(1.6)  (1.9)  (1.7)  (2.1)  (1.8)  (a8)
Dominica  5.37  4.05  4.78  Dominican  Republk  1.18  0.86  1.03
(S.2)  (5.1)  (6.7)  (2.7)  (3.8)  (3.0)
Grada  1.76  3.05  2.36  Jamaica  2.70  3.28  2.97
(4.9)  (3.)  (4.3)  (2.0)  (1.8)  (1.7)
St. Kitt and Nevt  2.77  4.35  3.50  Trinidad  and  Tobago  1.68  -0.31  0.76
(3.2)  (22)  (2.5)  (10.5)  (4.0)  (7.9)
St.Lucia  2.20  2.02  2.11
(2.5)  (3.4)  (2.6)
St. Vincent  2.10  0.76  1.48
(3.7)  (4.5)  (4.0)
Nonfactor  Servc  include  shipment,  pasenger  and  other transport  services. trawl.
-Flgures In parenhes  am standard  deviions.
Source: Appendix  I and Appendix  2.6
exogenous, the cumulative  impact of net external borrowing is due in part to the policies adopted in
reaction to previous shocks. Fluctuations  in each of these typically  affect GNP growth, and the current
account in particular, and so lead to changes in economic  welfare. Other shocks, which also had an
impact on GDP and welfare, such as the various hurricanes  which devastated  the Caribbean  at the end
of the seventies  and in the eighties  are not explicitly  measured.
9.  While the general character of the external shocks may be  similar, each country
involves a distinct set of economic, socio-political  and institutional  features so that it is essential to
consider countries on an individual  basis. All countries except Trinidad and Tobago are oil importers
and so were vulnerable to the oil shocks of the seventies. Trinidad, being an oil exporter, benefited
from these prices increases. There were also significant  swings in commodity  prices, both favorable
and unfavorable, where volatility posed a further challenge  for policy-makers  trying to steer a prudent
course. Most islands were also severely impacted by changes in  interest rates as they went from
negative  real levels in the seventies to over 10 percent in the early eighties. Others, such as Jamaica,
were adversely affected by the  US dollar depreciation during this period. Shocks, together with
standard deviations (a measure of volatility)  are shown in Table 3.  The individual  country details are
given in Appendix 1.  It is noted that the OECS group typically suffered more severe shocks than the
countries in the non-OECS sample except for Jamaica. Yet the OECS group did better during this
period in terms of growth rates. Table 5 shows the comparative  growth performances  in the two sets of
countries in the period 1980-92. OECS countries experienced average real growth  rates above 5
percent with the exception  of Grenada (3.6 percent), well above the rates recorded by countries in the
second group. In order to  seek an answer the performance responses of these countries are first
examined.
III.  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES
10.  As countries are impacted  by external shocks, policymakers  take various measures to
address them.  The appropriate  type of  ideal response  depends on many factors: characteristics  of the
specific type of shock, whether it is permanent  or not; whether its primary impact is on the supply or7
demand side; what is politically  feasible in the economy; what degrees of freedom policymakers  may
have in their particular institutional  framework;  how much access, if any, they have to financing.  In
this analysis  the resulting performance  response  is estimated  by computing  a number of measures such
as export expansion, import intensity, economic  compression,  and additional net external financing  as
defined in the methodological  appendix  (Appendix  2). The actual response is related through a complex
array of variables to the shocks. Typically  it involves  fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy and in
most instances  changes in external  financing.  It could also involve structural changes  in trade regime
or perhaps incomes  policy if it were deemed  an appropriate  instrument to moderate  aggregate  demand.
However, rigid labor markets in many of the islands here considered would tend to  reduce the
effectiveness  of incomes  policy.
11.  Summary  statistics  of the performance  measures  of these countries is given in Table 4.
Again individual country details are given in the Appendix 1. Even these broad patterns suggest
significant  differences  in responses.
12.  OECS.  In terms of export expansion the OECS group was far  more successful
throughout the period and especially  during  the first half. This was mainly driven by the recovery in
the production of the main export crops after a temporary collapse caused by natural disasters. One
also notes the OECS group tended to increase  their imports per unit of output, as reflected in the
negative import intensity measures, during the first sub-period. The negative economic compression
measures  indicate  that output  expansion  had been quite substantial  in four of the OECS countries in the
period 1980-86.  The main picture which emerges  from these performance  measures is that both exports
and imports grew over the entire period and that the expansion  in imports was partially explained  by
output growth. Large investments in infrastructure  boosted demand for imports, particularly in the
period 1983-89. Exports expanded  over the period, and countries, except St. Vincent, used additional
net external  financing  (ANEF) to partially offset the impact  of adverse  shocks.
13.  Barbados during the first  sub-period achieved  some export expansion  and did resort
to modest levels of additional net external financing.  This was accompanied by some economic
compression  and  increased  import intensity. During the second sub-period  the pattern was quite8
Table  4: Performance  Measures  as a percent  of GDP
(annual  average  over  corresponding  period)
1980-86  1987-92  1980-92  1980-86 1987-92  1980-92
(as  a percent  of  GDP)  ..  (as  a percent  of GDP)
Export  Expansion*
Antigua  0.75  0.75  0.75  Barbados  1.23  -1.30  0.06
Dominica  5.64  0.24  3.15  Dominican  Republic  -0.10  -1.37  -0.69
Grenada  0.50  -0.17  0.19  Jamaica  -2.75  0.69  -1.16
St.  Kitts  and  Nevis  0.59  -0.07  0.29  Trinidad  and  Tobago  -4.09  -1.50  -2.90
St.Lucia  2.91  2.04  2.51
St.  Vincent  7.70  -1.65  3.39
Import  lntensltf
Antigua  -5.78  5.13  -0.74  Barbados  -1.77  2.48  0.19
Dominica  -2.28  -1.26  -1.81  Dominican  Republic  -0.16  -0.38  -0.26
Grenada  -2.64  3.69  0.28  Jamaica  0.54  -0.61  0.01
St.  Kitts  and  Nevis  -2.63  0.14  -1.35  Trinidad  and  Tobago  1.99  -0.01  1.07
St.Lucia  -0.49  -1.82  -1.10
St.  Vincent  -1.87  1.86  -0.15
Economic  Compression**
Antigua  0.19  1.10  0.64  Barbados  0.77  1.00  0.87
Dominica  -2.39  0.38  -1.11  Dominican  Republic  0.34  -0.04  0.17
Grenada  0.77  0.99  0.87  Jamaica  -0.08  -0.25  -0.16
St Kitts  and  Nevis  -0.44  0.07  -0.16  Trinidad  and  Tobago  2.07  -0.61  0.83
St.Lucia  -1.64  0.81  -0.41
St.  Vincent  -0.96  0.24  -0.41
ANEF*`
Antigua  6.99  -5.40  1.28  Barbados  0.73  -1.97  -0.51
Dominica  4.39  4.68  4.52  Dominican  Republic  1.10  2.66  1.82
Grenada  3.12  -1.45  1.01  Jamaica  4.98  3.45  4.28
St Kitts  and  Nevis  5.13  4.21  4.70  Trinidad  and  Tobago  1.72  1.82  1.76
SLLucia  1.18  0.98  1.09
St Vincent  -2.77  0.30  -1.35
Total  Performance  Measures
Antigua  2.13  1.58  1.88  Barbados  0.96  0.21  0.62
Dominica  5.37  4.05  4.76  Dominican  Republic  1.18  0.86  1.03
Grenada  1.76  3.05  2.36  Jamaica  2.70  3.28  2.97
St.  Kitts  and  Nevis  2.77  4.35  3.50  Trinidad  and  Tobago  1.68  -0.31  0.76
St.Lucia  2.20  2.02  2.11
St.  Vincent  2.10  0.76  1.48
Export  expansion  refers  to merchandise  export.  Positive  values  correspond  to improvements  in  the  country's  export  share.
Import  Intensity  refers  to  merchandise  import.  Positive  values  correspond  to  import  compression.
Positive  values  correspond  to  GDP  compression.
- Additional  Net  Extemal  Financing.  Positive  values  correspond  to  an  increase  in  external  financing.
Source:  Appendix  1 and  Appendix  2.9
different. While there was some further economic compression, export expansion efforts faltered,
import substitution  increased  and there was a  decline  in net additional  external  financing.
14.  Jamaica on the other hand suffered  the largest shock among the non-OECS  group
and took a  different tack. During the first sub-period it  primarily resorted to additional external
borrowing  and actually  retrogressed on export expansion.  This set the stage for an even poorer
performance  during  the second sub-period. The situation was further compounded  by the structure of
the Jamaican debt. It contained a basket of currencies so that US dollar service repayments  increased
substantially  when that currency depreciated  during the eighties against  the yen and D-mark.
15.  Dominican  Republic also relied on increased  additional  net external borrowing  during
the first sub-period and  advanced little on export expansion. During the second sub-period it relied
even more on ANEF and allowed its export expansion  efforts to deteriorate  even further.
16.  Trinidad  and Tobago was the only oil exporter among  all the countries considered  in
this analysis.  During the first sub-period it increased its ANEF and allowed its export share to
deteriorate. During the  second sub-period when oil prices fell,  its  export position continued to
deteriorate and imports were not compressed  so that it had to resort  again to ANEF. This in turn
resulted in a  more difficult economic  situation  than at the beginning of the period as most of the
problems like poor competitiveness  and high unemployment  still remained and now, in  addition,
Trinidad has a much higher external  debt.
17.  Thus the broad pattern that emerges is that the OECS group seems to have done much
better than the non-OECS  group. Each group seems to have resorted to ANEF during the period.  The
OECS group seems to have moved towards a more import intensive  growth pattern and also seems to
have done  better  on  export expansion.  We now  consider some of  the  underlying economic
performance  measures  to throw some light on  this.10
IV.  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  MEASURES
18.  A number of economic  performance measures  are given in Table 5.  These give some
indication of  the policies pursued.  The table includes some of the typical flow variables but also
includes some measures of debt and also of social progress. Ideally one would also like to include
information  on the environment in order to make an overall assessment of the sustainability of the
strategy  followed  but this was not available  to us at this time.
19.  Growth.  The  OECS countries recorded higher  output growth  than  the  larger
economies  over the period here considered. This disparity is even more evident in terms of GNP per
capita growth. While the OECS countries achieved  annual growth rates around 5 percent, Trinidad and
Dominican Republic with negative growth rate were the worst performers. Jamaica and Barbados
attained  real per capita  growth rates of 0.2 and 1 percent respectively.  It is important  to notice that the
OECS  economies  started the 1980s  from a lower base than the other economies  here considered. At the
sectoral level (see Table 2) one notes that the OECS group was particularly successful in the tourism
and service sector but also achieved  good growth rates in manufacturing.
20.  Inflation  and  REER.  The OECS group had a  good record on  inflation  while
Barbados  was the best performer among the non-OECS  group. It is notable that the OECS group had
currency board arrangement  and that the Barbados  dollar is pegged to the US dollar which no doubt
helped. Historically, this kind of arrangement has been very effective in  keeping inflation under
control, in particular in small countries  such as the OECS  islands, extremely  sensitive  to changes  in the
world inflation. 7 Both groups of countries started the decade of the eighties with annual rates of
inflation above 15 and then followed  different  paths: the OECS islands and Barbados managed  to keep
the annual rate of inflation below 8 percent, while Jamaica and Dominican Republic recorded rates
above 20 percent. Volatility of the inflation rate at around 20 percent for the period 1980-92 was
another source of instability in the economy  of these two countries. This is also reflected in the high
variability  of the Real Effective  Exchange  Rate (REER),  Table 5 and Figure 1. These two wrought a
7  However, Hanke,  Jonung  and Schuler  (1993)  suggest  that a currency  board would be appropriate  also for large
economies  that have a history  of high inflation.11
Table  5: ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES,  1980-92
GDPGrow1  jnIflation 2  REER  Extenmal  Debt4  interest over Debt %5
Antigua  and Barbuda  589  5.7 (4.8)  102 (5.0)  43.7  6.8
Dominica  5.0  6.4 (6.3)  112 (10.1)  27.5  2.4
Grenada  3.6  6.2 (6.6)  118 (12.3)  30.8  2.7
St.KItts  and Nevis  5.6  4.6 (4.8)  100 (7.7)  7.8  2.5
St.  Lucia  5.3  5.6 (5.6)  107 (7.0)  7.8  3,5
St Vincent  and the Grenadines  5.8  5.5 (4.8)  106 (6.5)  10.1  3.5
OTHERS
Barbados  0.4  6.5 (4.1)  118 (9.4)  20.9  7.0
Dominican  Republic  2.4  25.7  (20.0)  78 (17.5)  30.3  5.3
Jamaica  1.5  23.6 (20.2)  76 (19.9)  78.8  6.4
Trinidad  and Tobago  -1.4  10.7  (3.9)  117 (23.3)  34.9  8.4
QA  EPublic  Inv,Mr  Natlonal  Savinga  \8  Foreign  Savings  \9
Antigua  and  Barbuda  38.0  13.0  14.2  21.8
Dominica  32.3  18.1  11.1  21.2
Grenada  36.4  21.5  14.6  21.9
St.Kitts  and Nevis  39.2  10.5  23.8  15.4
St Lucia  25.3  10.3  11.6  13.6
St.  Vincent  and the Grenadines  30.6  12.7  16.7  13.9
OTHERS
Barbados  18.7  6.8  17.8  1.1
Dominican  Republic  23.2  7.3  18.0  5.3
Jamaica  20.6  8.6  11.9  8.7
Trinidad  and  Tobago  20.4  8.4  18.4  2.0
HQDI\110  Life  Exnctancv  11  Inf. Mort Rate  III  Public  Ex  on Educ.%12  Adult Illiteracy Rate\13
OECS1992  1982  1992  1982  1980-88  1989-90
Antigua  and Barbuda  0.79  72  74  29  20  2.9  5.0
Dominica  0.75  71  72  20  18  4.9  6.0
Grenada  0.71  67  71  39  29  5.7  3.0
St.Kitts  and Nevis  0.73  64  88  45  34  4.6
St.  Lucia  0.71  69  70  25  19  7.4  10.0
St.  Vincent  and the  Grenadines  0.73  68  71  31  20  5.9  18.0
OTHER
Barbados  0.89  73  75  17  10  5.8  1.0
Dominican  Republic  0.64  64  68  50  41  1  8  20.0
Jamaica  0.75  71  74  18  14  5.9  8.0
Trinidad  and Tobago  0.86  69  71  31  15  5.1  4.0
Figures  in parenthesis  are  standard  deviabons
Notes:
1.  Annual  real GDP  growth  rate.  GDP  at factor  cost  for all OECS  except  St Vincent  and  the Grenadines.  Worid  Bank  (1994)
2. Annual  rate  of inflation.  Based  on CPI from  IMF.  IFSBA,  BESD  database.
3. Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate.  Index  numbers  1980=100.  Period  average.  IMF.
4. Total  Extemal  Debt  (%  of GNP).  Difference  between  1980  and 1992  (percentage  points).  World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tables,  DX.
5. Total  Interest  Payments  to Total  Extemal  Debt  (%).  Annual  average.  Wold Bank.  Vorld Debt  Tables,  DX.
8. Gross  Domestic  Investment  (%  of GDP).  Annual  average.  National  authorities,  IMF  and IBRD
7. Public  Investment  (%  of GDP).  Average  annual.  Nabonal  authorities,  IMF  and IBRD.
8. National  Savings  = Gross  Domestic  Saving  + Net  Factor  Income  + Current  Tran3fers.  Annual  average.  World  Bank  (1994)  p. 175
9. Foreign  Savings  = Gross  Domestic  Investment  - National  Savings.  Annual  average.  World  Bank  (1994)  p.175
10.  Human  Development  Index.  This  index  is based  on measures  of longevity,  knowledge  and decent  living standards.
HDI'0.8  = high  human  development;  HDI<0.5  = low  human  development.UNDP  (1994)
11.  World  Bank,  Worid  Tables.  STARS  1994
12.  Public  Expenditure  on Education  (%  of GNP).  World  Bank  (1994)  p.238
13. Percent.  Grenada  (1979).  World  Bank  (1993a)  p.52L- - - - - - - - - - - =  - --  - - - ~  ~-  - - - -
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significant depreciation. All other countries in this sample had modest appreciation on average over
the period. The OECS currency, the Eastern  Caribbean dollar, has been pegged  to the US dollar since
1976 and much of the fluctuation  in the REER reflects changes in the external value of the US dollar.
Trinidad, whose  performance  was different from all other islands, managed to reduce its annual rate of
inflation from 13 percent in the period 1980-86  to 8 percent in the period 1987-92  and to restore the
REER at its 1980 level after a strong appreciation  in the middle of the decade.
21.  Investment-Savings. Here again one  notes striking differences between the two
groups with the OECS islands having average investment  ratios above the 30 percent level while the
corresponding  value for the non-OECS  group was around 20 percent (see Table 5).  The OECS group
also had public investment  shares above 10 percent of GDP or about double the level of the non-OECS
group. Within the OECS group, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent have maintained  high levels of
public savings to partially fund their investment  programs. The financing patterns also differ widely.
The OECS group relied on both foreign and national savings while among the non-OECS group,
Dominican  Republic and Jamaica  had significant  external  foreign  financing  but not nearly as much as
the  OECS group. Thus one notes that the OECS group had much higher investment shares. In
Antigua, Dominica and Grenada these were financed primarily by external sources and in the other
three by an almost equal proportion of domestic and external sources. Given the high unit costs of
infrastructure  and the high number of emergency  investments,  it is difficult to assess the profitability of
investment  in the OECS countries.  The ICORs are somewhat  unstable and not particularly informative.
However, data do suggest  that the high investment  shares in the OECS were associated with strong
growth performance which supports the view that  investment in  these countries was reasonably
effective.
22.  Debt and Debt Service.  The debt to GNP ratio increased in all countries in the
sample over the period 1980-92  (Table 5). St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent in the OECS group had
only modest increases of  10 percent or less. These three also enjoyed the lowest interest to debt
payment ratio.  At the other end of the spectrum is Jamaica whose debt/GDP ratio increased by 78
percent over the period. It is notable that all of  the OECS countries but Antigua had interest/debt14
ratios less than anyone of  the non-OECS group.8  However it seems that the financing of this
investment  highlights crucial differences. While the  OECS countries did  increase net external
borrowing the terms seem to have been particularly favorable. Thus the interest rate burden for the
OECS group was less than their average growth rate. For the non-OECS  group, on the other hand, the
interest burden/debt ratio  was higher than their average growth rate so that it became inevitable that
their approach  to economic  growth was not sustainable  even within a narrow economic  definition.  This
difference is also confirmed by the larger portion of concessional  debt as a share of total debt (see
Figure 2)  contracted  by the OECS countries, again with the exception  of Antigua.
23.  Social Variables.  Over a relatively  short period of 12 years it is difficult  to assess the
progress or lack thereof in most countries. The 1992 Human Development  Index (HDI) of the United
Nations suggests that the OECS group and the four other countries compare favorably with other
middle-income  developing countries. Barbados and Trinidad rank respectively 20th and 35th in the
"high human" development  group. All others are in the "medium human" development  cohort. Life
expectancy  and infant mortality rates have improved  in all countries. Public expenditure  on education
as a percent of GNP was on average around 5 percent for the entire sample in the period 1980-88.
V.  ANALYSIS
24.  A number of regression estimates were made to try to clarify some of the relations
discussed in the previous sections. Results of the estimated equations for the period 1980-92 with
investment  (gross domestic investment)  as the dependent  variable  are reported in Table 6 and with real
GDP growth as the dependent  variable in Table 7.
25.  Investments (GDI) were regressed on the flow of Official Development Assistance
(ODA), change in inflation (INFL), public sector balance (PSBALA), terms of trade shocks (TOT),
black market premium (BMP) and foreign direct investments  (FDI) for the period 1980-92.  A dummy
8  Presently,  Antigua  is not  considered  creditworthy  for IBRD  lending.  The  country  has heavily  relied  on
commercial  loans  with  short-term  maturities,  and  cumulated  arrears  over  the  period  under  analysis.15
Figure  2: Concessional  Debt and Interest  Payments  as a percent  of Total External  Debt 1980-1993
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variable (OECSDUM)  was introduced to separate the OECS countries from the other group. The
results show that external financing  through ODA and FDI, both significant, exerted a positive impact
on GDI while inflation,  albeit negative, and terms of trade shocks were not significant.  In equations  C
and D the coefficients  for black market premium and public sector balance were both significantly
negative. A possible explanation  of the latter result is that an increase in the public sector surplus or a
reduction in the deficit depresses investments, at least in the  short run. In  equation D  with the
introduction of the OECS dummy variable, the coefficient of inflation becomes significant at the 10
percent level and positive. One interpretation  of this result is that investment  decisions  are not affected
by low levels of inflation  as those experienced  by the OECS countries during the period under analysis
(see Figure 1). Other studies such as Cardoso and Fishlow (1990), Little and al. (1994), Bruno and
Easterly (1994) show that only relatively  high inflation inhibits growth. Equation D also indicates  that
presence in the OECS group, picked up by the dummy  variable has an economically  and statistically
positive influence.  Since the OECS group members have currency board arrangements,  advocates of
currency  boards such as Hanke (1994) would certainly  support the view that  currency  boards are good
for reducing uncertainty, increasing confidence and so lead to  improved investment performance.
While the present evidence  supports this view, it is not clear to what extent other variables also played
a role.
26.  The results for GDP growth are presented  in Table 7. In the first four equations  (E, F,
G, H) growth was regressed on GDI, ODA, INFL, TOT, PSBALA and alternatively  on government
consumption  (PUBCONS)  and public savings (PUBSAV).  Again, a dummy  variable (OECSDUM)  was
introduced  to separate the OECS from the non-OECS  countries. In general the investment  ratio (GDI)
was always significant  and it has also typically a coefficient  of about 0.15  which is similar to results
obtained by other researchers for other countries. The terms of trade shock (TOT) coefficient is
negative  but insignificant.  This is probably because countervailing  action is taken to offset its effect.
Thus the effect of external shocks will often show up in increased debt ratios or reduced expenditures
in  public sector areas such as for health and education.  However, estimates  for the two periods 1980-
86 and  1987-92, not  shown in Table 7, suggest that the volatility of the terms of trade shocks,
measured  by the standard  deviation  of the terms of trade shocks over the period considered, did exert a
significant  and negative  influence  on growth. This is presumably  because it introduces  a degree of17
TABLE 6:  PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT (GDI)
Dependent  variable:  Gross domestic  investment  as a share  of GDP
1980-1992.  10 countries
Figures  in parentheses  are standard  errors
Independent  Variables:  Constant  ODA  INFL  PSBALA  TOT  BMP  FDI  OECSDUM  R 2
Equation  no.
A  19.639-^'  0.693-  -0.001  0.108  0.870-  0.45
(1.315)  (0.114)  (0.055)  (0.168)  (0.110)
B  23.005"'  0.281'  -0.087  -0.511'*'  0.119  0.33
(1.303)  (0.146)  (0.060)  (0.097)  (0.186)
C  24.333-  0.238-  -0.063  -0.527...  -0.066-  0.35
(1.426)  (0.145)  (0.060)  (0.095)  (0.033)
D  17.025'-  -0.134  0.096^  -0.482^  -0.001  11.742--  0.52
(1.643)  (0.137)  (0.057)  (0.082)  (0.030)  (1.756)
Statistically  significant  at the 10% level
Statistically  significant  at the 5% level
Statistically  significant  at the 1  % level
Variables:
GDI= Gross domestic  investmentlGDP
ODA  Net Official  Development  Assistance/GDP
INFL =  Rate of change  in inflation
PSBALA=  Overall  public  sector balance/GDP
TOT= Terms  of trade  shocks/GDP
BMP=  Black market  premium
FDI= Foreign  direct investments/GDP
OECSDUM=dummy  variable  with the value  of one in OECS  countries  and zero  elsewhere.
Source:  Appendix  218
TABLE  7:  PARAMETER  ESTIMATES  FOR GDP  GROWTH
Dependent  variable: Real GDP growth rate
1980-1992,  10 countries
Figures  in parentheses  are standard errors
Independent  Variables  Constant  GDI  ODA  INFL  PSBALA  PUBCONS PUBSAV  TOT  OECSDUM  R 2
Equation  no.
E  -0.308  0.161...  0.206-'  -0.092-  0.131--  -0.007  0.29
(1.073)  (0.039)  (0.065)  (0.026)  (0.047)  (0.082)
F  -0.208  0.106-  0.141-  -0.061-  0.109-  -0.022  2.250-  0.32
(1.058)  (0.045)  (0.070)  (0.029)  (0.047)  (0.081)  (1.012)
G  5.466...  0.125-  0.233--  -0.134-  -0.303-  0.31
(1.860)  (0.035)  (0.066)  (0.028)  (0.091)
H  -0.138  0.103...  0.165--  -0.094-*  0.208-  0.31
(1.043)  (0.035)  (0.060)  (0.026)  (0.064)
Constant  GDI  ODA  XGNFS  TOUR  PUBSAV  OECSDUM  R 2
-8.557...  0.076-  0.154--  0.154..  0.091...  0.40
(1.504)  (0.033)  (0.065)  (0.025)  (0.029)
J  -6.000...  0.030  0.050  0.112-  0.093-  2.833...  0.43
(1.731)  (0.036)  (0.074)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.953)
K  -8.163-  0.075-  0.149-  0.140-  0.088-  0.145-  0.42
(1.496)  (0.033)  (0.084)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.070)
L  -5.442...  0.027  0.039  0.094-  0.090-  0.157-  2.7e8...  0.46
(1.716)  (0.036)  (0.073)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.068)  (0.937)
Statistically  significant  at the  10%  level
Statistically  significant  at  the  5% level
- Statistically  significant  at the  1%  level
Variables:
GDl=  Gross  domestic  investment/GDP
ODA  =  Net  Official  Development  Assistance/GDP
INFL  =  Rate  of  change  in inflation
PSBALA=  Overall  public  sector  balance/GDP
PUBCONS=Govemment  consumption/GDP
PUBSAV=Public  savings/GDP
TOT=  Terms  of trade  shocks/GDP
XGNFS=  Exports  of  goods  and  nonfactor  services/GDP
TOUR=  Annual  rate  of growth  in tourist  arrivals
OECSDUM=dummy  variable  with  the  value  of one  in OECS  countries  and  zero  elsewhere.
Source:  Appendix  219
uncertainty into investment  decisions. Similar results were achieved  adding a variable representing  the
real effective  exchange  rate volatility.
27.  The ODA and inflation coefficients were both significant at the  I percent level in
equations  E, G and H (at the 5 percent level in equation  F) with the expected  signs suggesting  that high
levels of official aid from multilateral and bilateral donors enhanced economic  growth. Substituting
ODA with the stock of concessional  debt variable (concessional  debt as a share of total external debt)
did not change these results significantly. PSBALA, PUBCONS  and PUBSAV were used as a proxy
for fiscal policy. In all equations they were statistically significant. While improvements  in public
sector balances and public savings seemed to  have had a positive impact on growth, governrment
consumption  had the opposite  effect. This supports  the common  observation  that sound economic  fiscal
management  engendered  successful  economic  performances.  The positive and significant  coefficient  of
the dummy  variable in equation F suggests that other characteristics  peculiar to OECS countries might
explain their higher growth.
28.  The results of the last four equations  reported in Table 7 point out that the openness  to
international  trade, measured  by exports to GDP ratio, and tourism, measured  by the rate of growth in
tourist arrivals, also had a  positive and highly significant relationship to  real  GDP growth. The
explanatory  power of tourism and public savings is enhanced  by the introduction  of the OECS dummy.
29.  In summary  the results show that investment-GDP  share  is positively correlated with
whether the island is in the OECS group and to the availability of external financing. Growth is
positively related to investment-GDP  share, availability  of concessional  external financing, and sound
fiscal management. On the contrary it  is  negatively related to  inflation, terms of  trade shocks
variability  and real effective  exchange  rate volatility.20
VI.  CONCLUSION
30.  Countries in the Caribbean area have been  relatively open. This has meant that they
have been subject to a variety of external shocks especially  due to terms of trade effects and changes
in the external demand for their exports. The response  to these shocks has varied significantly  so that
the economic  performance  has been quite different between  countries. The OECS group in particular
has achieved  quite impressive  growth rates while the non-OECS  group considered  in this paper has not
been so fortunate. Both groups achieved some progress on a number of social measures but also
increased  their external  indebtedness  over the period. The question  then is why did the OECS group do
better. It seems that this group was able to achieve significantly  higher growth rates based on higher
investment rates. The OECS group also had monetary board arrangements  which may have been
supportive of greater confidence in the policy regime, in keeping inflation under control, and  in
maintaining  fiscal discipline.9  One of the findings  of this paper is that part of the success of this group
was due to the corresponding interest burden/debt ratios. For the OECS group it was less than the
average GDP growth rate which contrasts  sharply with the non-OECS  group  where the opposite was
true.10  Thus access  to concessional  lending, if it is channeled  into productive investment,  seems to be a
key element in the strong economic  performance  of the OECS  group.
31.  There is of course an obverse side to this analysis. If the OECS countries are to
continue their strong economic growth performance  then they will need to maintain high investment
shares and ensure that this is used productively.  In order to do this they will need either continuing
access to  concessionary financing or increasing their share of domestic savings or attracting more
direct investments. As concessionary  flows become less available globally, these economies will need
to persevere in their policies to ensure continuing donors' support and foreign investors' interest.
However, given the high exposure  to changes  both in the economic  and climatic  external environment
it would  be  desirable to  continue supporting countries who are undertaking serious  reforms to
restructure their economy.
9  On the  effectiveness  of currency  board  in promoting  growth  in developing  countries  see  Hanke  and  Schuler
(1994).
10  An  interesting  evaluation  of a country's  debt  sustainability  can  be found  in Cohen  (1985)  and  (1988).21
APPENDIX 1: Country-by-Country Analysis
This  appendix provides,  in  the  first  section,  a  brief  overview of  the  external
environment faced by  the OECS countries. In the second section, shocks, performance response
measures and selected  economic  variables for each country included in this study are described. Each
description is  accompanied by  a  table  which provides annual data on  external shocks,  policy
performance  measures  and selected  economic  variables."
A.  OECS
The OECS countries  started the decade of the 1980s suffering setbacks in all economic
sectors. The second oil shock, and its inflationary  consequences  at world level, caused an increase in
the price of their imports and affected  the availability  of intermediate  inputs. Meanwhile,  on the export
side, sugar prices dropped after 1980 and banana prices recorded strong fluctuations in the period
1980-85.  The recession in the industrial world after the second oil shock had a strong negative impact
on tourism, the major resource of foreign  exchange  for most of these countries. The effects  of changed
external circumstances  were aggravated by a few destructive natural disasters, including a volcanic
eruption, hurricanes such as Hurricane David in  1979 and Hurricane Hugo in  1989, and several
storms.
After  1983 the OECS countries recovered through the exploitation of  new trade
opportunities, especially in terms of developing business and financial services. The recovery in the
world economy  also provided a boost in tourism.
The international  environment  worsened  again after 1986 and in particular at the end of
the decade. The Gulf War in 1990,  besides leading to a temporary increase in the oil price, provoked a
further shock through a decrease in tourist arrivals with different effects within the OECS group.
These shocks occurred after hurricane Hugo had damaged agricultural crops and infrastructure. The
'"  This  analysis  greatly  benefited  from  the  work  of Worrel  (1987),  Harker  (1992)  and World  Bank  reports.22
slowdown in the US and Europe in the first years of the 1990s represented another blow to  these
economies.
High real interest rates in international  financial markets in the 1980s imposed severe
foreign exchange losses on countries which had borrowed heavily abroad in their efforts to balance
external  receipts and payments  during the 1970s. Given the high portion of concessional  debt over total
external debt, the OECS countries did not suffer as much as other countries in the Caribbean region
and in Latin America.
It is commonly  accepted that these islands were able to navigate  through the unstable
external environment  of the 1980s  by expanding  tourism, which is at present the most important  source
of foreign exchange, and by exporting agricultural products, particularly bananas and sugar, under
preferential market agreements to the European Union. However, the country by country analysis
shows that other factors  contributed  to the positive  overall performance  of these small open economies.
One of the most important institutional arrangements  of these islands is the Eastern
Caribbean  Central Bank (ECCB), which replaced  the East Caribbean Currency Authority in 1983. The
main objectives  of  the ECCB are the maintenance  of the international  value of the Eastern Caribbean
dollar, fixed since 1976 at EC$2.7 to US$1, and the promotion of monetary stability. Any change in
the exchange rate of the Eastern Caribbean dollar requires unanimous  agreement  of all member states.
The ECCB has worked well in the past and has succeeded in keeping foreign exchange cover well
above the required 60 percent of  its liabilities (currency and other demand liabilities). Credit to
member governments,  and therefore  credit expansion,  has been circumscribed  within tight limits.
1.  Antigua and Barbuda
Shocks.  Antigua experienced  adverse  shocks at the beginning of the 1980s  and after
1986 (see Table 8). These were mainly determined  by unfavorable  terms of trade shocks. However,
while the shocks in the second half of the decade are explained  by adverse movements in export and
import prices, the 1981  shock was due to a constraint  in the capacity  to export and to the difficulty in23
Table  8  Antigua  and  Barbuda
EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
(percent  of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Extemnal  Shocks
Temisof Trade  5.2  30  -07  -1.3  -04  -08  03  53  0.8  0.9  37  36  1 1
Nonfactor Servas  Effect  -3 4  -0 2  0.9  0 7  0.8  1 1  -0 3  -2.4  -1 3  -1 4  -4 5  -2 9  -1 2
ExportVolume  00  07  2.0  04  -0.7  01  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.1  00  01  0.1
IntrarestRate  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  0.0  0.0  00  00  00  0.0
Total  18  3 5  2.2  -0.2  -0.3  0 4  0.0  2.7  -0.8  -0.7  -0.8  0 7  -01
AddibonalDebtServiae  00  06  22  25  0.6  13  04  2.5  24  2.1  13  02  -01
TOTAL(Total.AddttionalDebtService)  18  40  44  23  0.2  18  04  5.2  16  14  05  09  -01
Performance  Measures
Addibonal  Net Extemal Finanong  3 9  13.9  12.2  -19.1  12.5  -8 5  34.0  1 4  -4 8  -6 2  -12.5  -4 6  -5 8
ExporlExpension  80  89  -9.1  -09  -1.7  -21  22  -05  -01  13  -10  00  47
Import ntenarty  -10 1  -20  4  -4.7  23.7  -9 5  14  6  -34 0  5  9  6 0  4 9  111  4 0  -1 2
Economic Compression  0 0  1 6  6.0  -1 5  -1 0  -2.3  -1 8  -1 7  0.4  14  2.8  1 4  2 2
TOTAL  18  40  44  23  02  18  04  52  16  14  05  09  -01
801s  87-92  80-92
Av  Sdev  Awsne  Sdev  Awmpe  Sdev
Extnaml Shocks
Terms of Trade  0 8  2.4  2 6  19  16  2 3
Nonractor  Services Effect  -0 1  1.6  -2.3  1 3  -1 1  1 8
Expor Volume  0 4  0.8  -01  01  0 2  0 6
intrerest  Rate  00  0 0  0°0  0 0  0°0  00 
Total  1 1  1 5  0.2  14  0 7  14
Additional Debt Service  1 1  0.9  1.4  1 1  1 2  1 0
TOTAL (Total #Addttional  Debt Service)  2 1  1 6  I 6  1 9  1 9  1 7
Performance Measures
Addibonal Net External Fiancng  7.0  17.2  S  4  4 4  1 3  14  0
Export Expansion  08  6 3  0.7  21  0 7  4 6
Impot  Intensity  -5 8  19  7  5 1  4 0  -0 7  15  2
Eoonomic  Compression  02  2.9  1.1  16  06  2.3
TOTAL  21  16  16  19  19  1 7
Sources.  Appendix 2
SELECTED ECONOMIC  VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDPGROWTHRATE  (%) \1  67  50  04  69  75  88  97  90  77  8.3  34  43  1 7
INFLATION(%)  \2  190  115  42  2.3  39  10  23  36  6.8  3.7  7.0  57  30
GROSSDOMESTICINVESTMENT (%oIGDP)\3  390  504  370  204  24.9  227  740  438  45.5  376  25.3  25.0  217
NATIONALSAVINGS(%ofGDP)  14  139  161  53  104  23.8  104  185  156  197  152  99  145  11  1
FOREIGN SAVINGS (% of  GDP)  \5  251  343  317  100  1 1  123  555  282  25.8  224  154  105  106
PUBLICSECTORBALANCE(%o/GDP)  \6  -43  -104  -116  -62  -42  -13  -465  .175  -11.0  -9.6  -60  -66  -32
REER(1980=100)  \7  1000  1047  1062  1071  1109  1109  1094  102 1  979  975  988  966  975
FOREIGN DIRECTINVESTMENT  (%ofGDP)\8  178  179  185  76  25  77  102  12.2  175  12.5  106  105  56
ODA FLOWS (% of GDP) \9  5 0  7 2  3 6  2.2  1 4  1 5  2 1  1 9  2 5  1.2  1.2  1 7  1 1
TOTAL EXT  DEBT I%ot GNP)\I0  296  265  243  231  22.5  314  440  701  603  639  648  644  733
INTEREST/ TOTAL EXT. DEBT (%)  \11  9 7  9 7  6 5  8 8  8 1  8 5  10  0  4 4  7 5  5.3  4.4  2 8  2 4
LIFE EXPECTANCY \12  72  73  74
INFANT MORTALITY RATE \13  29  22  20
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC  I% ot GNP)  3 1  3 2  3 3  3 3  2 5  2 2  2 8  2 4
1  Factor cost
2  Annual rate of inflation based on CPI  IMF, IFSBA from BESD database
3  National authonbes. IMF and IBRD
4  Nabonal Savings  Gross Domestic Saving . Net Factor Income + Currant Transfers World Bank (1994) p  175
5  Foreign Savings = Gross Domestic Investment - Nabonal Savings World Bank (1994) p 175
6  Public Sector Overall Balance World Bank (1994a)
7  Real Effective Exchange Rate Penod Average IMF
8  World Bank (1994a)
9  Net disoursements of ODA from  all sources = ODA Loans net v Grants Grants indude technical cooperabon  grants (OECD)
10 Total Extemal Debt (% of GNP) World Bank  World Debt  Tables. DX
11 Total interest Payments  to Total Extemal Debt I%)  World Bank. World Debt Tables  DX
12 Life expectancy at birth  (years)
13 Per 1000 live births24
cutting imports. Indeed, the economy  was recovering from the devastation  created by Hurricane David
in 1979, and therefore it was not able to take advantage  of the favorable  terms of trade movement.
Overall, the adverse shocks in the decade have been offset by gains in the nonfactor
services. Nonfactor receipts accounted  for almost 50 percent of GDP in 1980 and 96 percent in 1990,
which is the highest share among Caribbean countries (World Bank 1994a, p.  11). The other main
source of unfavorable  shocks is the additional  debt service. On average it has been above 1 percent of
GDP throughout  the period and it is explained  by the reliance  on external  borrowing which accelerated
in 1987.
Responses.  The negative and volatile import intensity measures (6 percent of GDP
with a standard deviation at 20 percent of GDP) in the period 1980-86  reflects the increased demand
for imports per unit of  output determined by the recovery after the hurricane. The construction
activity, mainly hotels, continued  despite the recession,  and official  borrowings  financed  major projects
such as a new airline terminal. The ANEF measure  suggests  that the current account balance  deficits in
the first part of the decade were financed with external  resources. Strong capital inflows, in particular
FDI, permitted  the country to maintain  a high level of gross domestic investment.
After 1987, Antigua recorded lower growth rates than in the previous five years. The
central government's financial  position weakened  as the growth in expenditure  exceeded the growth in
revenue. The government  was forced to reduce its investment  expenditures and experienced  difficulty
in meeting its scheduled  debt obligations. The steady  worsening  of the overall balance  of payments  was
financed  through the accumulation  of arrears.
Antigua, among OECS countries, has the highest outstanding  external debt (total debt
was 73 percent of GNP in 1992)  and the worst composition.  The stock of external arrears is about 50
percent of GDP and most of the debt, primarily  short-term, is owed to commercial  banks.25
2.  Dominica
Shocks. The high volatility  of growth rates in Dominica  in the first years of the 1980s
reflects the natural shock caused  by the hurricane in 1979 and its dependency  on banana exports. The
destruction of the crop and the damage  to the infrastructure  reduced  the country's export capacity. The
real output fluctuated from a negative 20 percent in  1979 to a  16 percent positive growth in the
following  year. Other major shocks, favorable  and unfavorable, occurred in 1986 and 1987. The 1990
shock is again explained by another major hurricane which curtailed banana production. Real GDP
growth fell from 8 percent in 1988 to negative I percent in 1989, rebounding  to around 6 percent in
1990, and then stabilizing  around 2 percent.
Responses.  After  the  fluctuations  in  the  real  output  growth  already  mentioned,
Dominica was able to stabilize real GDP growth at around 5 percent in the period 1984-91. Gains in
export shares were driven by recovery in the banana industry and are reflected in the high value of
export expansion in the period 1981-83 and 1986-87. Given the high dependency on food imports,
import intensity and GDP compression  could not be actively used by the government.  The positive
value of the import intensity measure in the first years of the 1990s  is explained  by the lower public
and private investment expenditure. Throughout the entire period under analysis the government
secured large capital inflows which partially sustained gross domestic investments (annual rate of
GDI/GDP  was 30 percent in the period 1980-92).
Private and official capital flows more than compensated for the  current account
deficits. Remittances from Dominicans  migrated to the United Kingdom, United States and Canada
have steadily grown throughout the entire period under analysis. Moreover, after  1979, a  sharp
increase in remittances took place in response to a boom in the construction sector to repair damage
caused  by Hurricane Hugo in neighboring  countries.
The external debt, mainly concessional,  doubled from 23 percent of the GNP in 1980
to 50 percent in 1992. Given the high dependency  on banana exports and a large public sector deficit
(negative 14 percent of GDP in 1992),  Dominica  is particularly exposed  to future  shocks.26
Table  9  Dominica
EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
(perceit  of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Extema Shocks
Terms of Trade  11.5  10.1  5.6  -2.9  08  -15  -6.9  11.9  -09  09  5.1  -1.1  0.8
Nonfdetor SeMces Effect  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.1  00  00  -0.2  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.1
Export Volume  01  0.4  1.8  0.8  .1.8  0.3  -01  -08  -1.7  -09  0.1  0.2  0.2
Intrerest  Rate  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  0.0  00  00  00  00  0.0
Total  11.8  10.7  74  -2.0  -0.9  -13  -73  116  -2.5  01  5.1  -0.8  1.0
Addibonal Debt Service  0.0  6.5  4.4  2.3  1.9  2.6  1.5  0 8  1.0  1 8  2.9  2.1  1.2
TOTAL(Total+AddfttonalDebtSesvlce)  11.8  171  118  03  1.0  13  -57  123  -15  19  81  13  2.1
Performance  Measures
Addibonal Net Extemal Finanong  44.5  -4  0  -6.6  -4 4  18.2  -41  -10.9  4.0  8.0  19.2  1 8  -3.5  -1.5
Expor  Expaion  -4 5  21.2  18.2  16  -2.5  -03  5 7  9.2  -2.6  -9.7  57  -1.7  0.8
Imponrntnaty  -21.0  10.8  1.3  15  -120  2.5  10  06  -55  -12.6  2.8  64  1.0
EconomicCompression  -72  -10.9  -1.1  16  -0.7  31  -1.5  -15  -13  5.0  -20  0.1  2.1
TOTAL  118  171  118  0.3  10  13  -57  12.3  -1.5  1.9  8.1  1.3  2.1
90f  87-92  60-92
A  _op  Sdev  Aeaoe  Sd4v  Awnge  Sdev
Extemal Shocks
Terms of Trade  2.4  6.9  2 8  5.0  2.6  5.8
Nortactor  Services  Effect  0.0  0.2  0 1  0.2  0.1  0.2
Export Volume  02  1.1  -05  0.8  -0.1  10
Intrerest  Rate  0 0  0.0  0.0  0 0  0.0  0.0
Total  2.6  7.3  2.4  5  1  2.5  6.1
Additonal Debt Service  2.7  2.1  1.6  08  2.2  1.7
TOTAL  (Totel +Addiltonal Debt ServIce)  5.4  8.2  4 0  5 1  4.8  6.7
Performance  Measures
Additional Net Extemal Finanong  4.4  19.7  47  82  4.5  14.9
Export Expawon  5.6  10.2  0.2  6.6  3.2  8.8
Import Intensity  -2.3  10.6  -13  68  -1.8  8.7
Economic Compression  -2.4  5.0  0.4  2.7  -1.1  4.2
TOTAL  5.4  8.2  4 0  5.1  4.8  6.7
Sources:  Appendix 2
SELECTED  ECONOMIC  VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDPGROWTH RATE f%) \i  164  64  2.4  2.1  5.4  17  6.8  6.8  80  -12  6.4  2.2  21
INFLATION(%)  \2  25.2  13.3  4.4  41  2.2  37  2.6  4.0  2.9  68  32  5.5  53
GROSS DOMESTIC  INVESTMENT  (% of GDP)U3  501  319  28.4  27.3  38.5  28.5  21.1  23.2  29.7  42.1  38.8  32.9  27.7
NATIONAL  SAVINGS  % of GDP)  \4  -5.9  -3 5  10.8  14.0  16.9  7 6  14.1  17.5  20.8  12.1  14  3  11.7  141
FOREIGN  SAVINGS (% of GDP)  IS  56.0  354  17.6  13.3  216  20.9  70  57  8.9  30.0  24.5  21.2  136
PUBLIC  SECTOR BALANCE  (% of GDP)  \6  -29 5  -21.7  -18.1  -15.5  -20.2  -11 8  -3.2  -4.8  -7.8  -20.1  -21 9  -8.  1  -13.6
REER(1980=100) \7  100.0  108.2  111.5  118.6  128.4  132.0  122.4  111.4  104.8  109.1  1016  104.6  1081
FOREIGN  DIRECT INVESTMENT  (% of GDP) \8  0 0  0 0  0.3  0.3  2.7  3.0  2.4  7.7  4.7  5 4  4 3  6.0  6.2
ODAFLOWS(%otGDP)\9  303  22.8  23.8  12.9  185  170  10.5  12.5  12.1  150  11.4  9.3  67
TOTAL EXT. DEBT (% of GNP)  110  23 7  213  28.1  44.4  53.9  56.0  513  57.5  512  52 7  54.4  53.9  51.2
INTEREST/TOTAL  EXT. DEBT(%) \11  14  14  2.0  2.9  3.0  29  33  2.3  2.4  24  2.2  2.2  2.4
LIFE EXPECTANCY 112  71  72  72
INFANT  MORTALITY RATE 113  20  22  20
PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC  I% of GNP)  5 7  5 2  5 3  4 4  3.9
1  Factor  cost
2  Annual rate of inflation based on CPI. IMF. IFSBA from BESD database
3  Nabonal authonties. IMF and IBRD
4  Nabonal Savngs  Gross Domestic  Saving + Net Factor Income - Current Transfers World Bank  (1994) p. 175
5  Foreign Savings= Gross Domestscinvestment  - National Savings World Bank (1994) p 175
6  Public Sector Overall Balance  World  Bank (1994a)
7  Real Effective Exchange Rate  Penod Average.IMF
8  Word Bank (1994a)
9  Net disbursements  of ODA from all sources = ODA Loans net v Grants. Grants include technical  cooperation grants. (OECD)
10 Total Extemal Debt  (% of GNP)  Word Bank  Word Debt Tables. DX
11 Total Interest Payments  to Total Extemal Debt I%)  World Bank. World Debt Tables. DX.
12  Life expectancy at birth (years)
13  Per 1000 live births27
3.  Grenada
Shocks.  The terms of trade shocks at the beginning of the 1980s wiped out earlier
terms of trade gains and caused a large balance  of payments  deficit in 1981. Terms of trade movements
were the principal evidence of the effects of world economic fluctuations  during the period under
analysis. In 1986 the country was able to take advantage  of the contemporary  increase in banana  prices
and decline in oil prices. Unfortunately, this gain was more than wiped out in the following years.
Furthermore, nutmeg  and mace exports, the country's major export crops, dropped with the collapse of
a  marketing arrangement with Indonesia. Tourism became an important source of revenues in  the
1990s  with the increase  of cruise ship visitors.
Stable growth averaging at around 5 percent was maintained during the period 1984-
90, and then slowed again to about 1.5 percent as the adverse effects of the recession  in the developed
countries  and the decline in agricultural  sector were compounded  by poor fiscal management.
Resnonses. The negative import intensity (-3 percent) trend in the first period was
reversed in the following years (4 percent in  1987-92).  Both import intensity and export expansion
measures  were extremely  volatile (see Table 10).
Fiscal policy was expansionary  over the period up to the beginning  of the 1990s. In the
first part of the 1980s the government initiated a program of massive public investment to sustain
output which is  reflected by  the largest public investment share in terms of GDP among OECS
countries (30 percent in 1980-86).  The fiscal situation became  critical after the 1987 and 1990 shocks.
In 1991 the current account of the BOP recorded a deficit of about 23 percent of GDP, while the
overall BOP deficit reached 9 percent of GDP which was financed  by accumulation  of external arrears.
In 1991  and 1992  the government  was unable to meet its debt obligations. The stock of extemal debt as
a percent of GNP is well above 50 percent (21 percent in 1980, 65 percent in 1992) and above 100
percent as a percent of exports of goods and nonfactor services in 1992 (42 percent in  1980). The
government is now reducing its arrears on both external debt and on obligations to  regional and
international  organizations.28
Table 10  Grenada
EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE  MEASURES
(pemcent of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1969  1990  1991  1992
Exmrnl  Shock
Terms of Trade  70  87  20  -27  0.3  -16  -5.8  103  1.1  1.8  4.0  -1.1  3.7
NonfactorServicesEffect  -24  -02  - 01  01  00  0.2  0.8  -1.5  -1.3  -03  -0.8  04  -04
ExportVolune  01  06  15  05  -1.1  02  -0.1  -0.5  -1.1  -04  00  0.1  01
IntrerestRfate  00  00  00  -01  0.1  -0.2  -0.2  00  01  0.1  -01  -01  -01
Total  47  91  36  -21  -0.4  -14  -5.3  85  -12  1.1  3.1  -08  33
Addibional  Debi Sevice  0 0  1 0  0 8  0 7  0 7  0.5  0.7  1 1  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.3
TOTALITotal+AddiltonalDebtServlce)  47  101  44  .14  0.1  .10  45  9.6  -0.4  19  37  -0.2  36
Perfomfence  Measures
Addibonal  Net External Finanong  6 3  0 3  2.0  -0 7  0.0  7 0  7 0  -4 2  -0.3  -0 7  2.7  -1.3  -5.0
Export Expoansion  -121  86  6.1  -0.4  -1.9  3.0  0.3  7.5  -59  -3.3  0.2  00  04
Import  intensity  6.8  -1.5  -3.2  -2.3  36  -10.3  -11.4  6.5  5.5  53  01  -0.  55.
Economic Compression  3.7  2 7  -0.4  2 0  -1 6  -0.6  -04  -0 2  0.3  0 6  0.7  1.9  2.7
TOTAL  47  101  44  -14  01  -10  45  9.6  -0 4  19  3.7  -0.2  3.6
80.111  .87-92  8092
Ange  Sdev  Av'ge  Sdev  AV*ag  Sdev
Exrtemnal  Sttok4
TermsatTreae  1 1  5.2  3 3  3.9  2.1  46
Nonfctor  Secvices Effect  -0.2  1.0  -0 7  0 7  -0 4  0.9
Expon Volume  0 3  0.8  -0 3  0.5  0.0  0 7
Inarest  Rate  0.0  0.1  0 0  0 1  0.0  0 1
Total  1.1  4.9  23  3.5  17  42
Additional Debt  Service  0.6  0.3  0 7  0 3  0 7  0.3
TOTAL ITotal .AddKttInal  Debt Service)  1.8  4.9  3 1  3.7  2 4  4 3
Perforynancei  Measu[s_
Additonal  Net Extemal Financing  3.1  3.5  -1 5  2.8  1.0  39
Export Expansion  05  6.7  -0.2  4.5  02  5.6
Impon Intensity  -2 6  6.7  3.7  3.2  0 3  6 1
Economic Compression  08  20  10  1.1  0.9  1.6
TOTAL  18  49  3.1  3.7  2.4  4.3
Sources:  Appendix 2
SELECTED  ECONOMIC VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1965  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDP GROWTH RATE  (%) t1  -1.5  2.1  5.3  1 4  56  4.9  5.5  6.0  5.3  5.7  5.2  2.6  -0.9
INFLATION I%)  \2  21.2  18.8  7.8  61  5.6  2.6  0.5  -0.9  4 0  5 6  2.7  2.6  3 8
GROSS  DOMESTIC INVESTMENT (% or GDP) 3  26.1  42.0  44 8  42.2  32.0  33.5  39.0  35 0  34.3  36.5  36.8  38.2  33.3
NATIONALSAVtNGS(%otGDP)  '4  8.3  10.6  65  10.7  12.1  11.5  14.4  176  19.9  17.1  20.2  20.1  20.3
FOREIGN SAVINGS  I% of GDP)  \5  178  31 4  383  31 5  199  22.0  24.6  174  14.4  194  16.6  18.1  13.0
PUBLICSECTORBALANCE(%  ofGDP)  v6  -195  -367  -432  -354  -21.3  -25.5  -22.5  -13.6  -106  -12.6  -11.1  .83  -05
REER(1980=100)  17  100.0  1156  122.7  129.3  137.9  1380  128.5  115.6  112.3  1173  107.9  106.3  105.7
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  (% of GDP) 8  0.0  0.0  2.1  2.7  2.7  3 5  3.5  9.8  9 0  5 6  6.4  7.2  10 7
OOAFLOWS(%  ofGDP)\9  4.3  76  76  80  26.9  300  18.5  12.7  12.1  7.9  68  76  5.6
TOTAL EXT. DEBT (% of GNP) 110  21.2  35.6  47.3  61  8  49.9  461  45 4  49 4  50 8  46 8  54.5  56 4  52.0
INTEREST/TOTAL EXT. DEBT (%)  111  4.8  3.0  3.2  26  3.6  2.7  2.3  2.5  3.4  19  1.4  1.4  1.9
LIFE EXPECTANCY 112  67  69  71
INFANT  MORTALITY RATE X13  39  34  29
PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC I% of GNP)  7 2  6 4  6 1  5.5  4 6  4 6
1  Factor  coat
2  Annual rate of inflation  based on CPI. IMF. IFSBA trom BESD database
3  Nabonal eutionbies. IMF and IBRO
4  Nelional Savings  Gross Domesti  Saving + Net Fador Income . Current Transters.Wortd  Bank (1994) p. 175
5  Foreign Savngs = Gross Domestic Investment -Nabonal Savings. World Bank (1994) p.175
6  Public Sector Overall Balance. World Bank (1994a)
7  Real Effective Exchange Rate.Penod  Average IMF
8  Wcild Bank (1994a)
9  Net disbursements of ODA trom all sources = ODA Loans net + Grants.  Grants include technical  cooperation grants (OECD)
10 Total External Debt 1%  of GNP)  World  Bank  World Debt Tables.  DX
11 Total interest Payments  to Total Extemal Debt (%). World Bank  World Debt  Tables. DX
12 Life expectancy at birth (years)
13 Per 1000 live births29
4.  St. Kitts and Nevis
Shocks.  The country's economic performances followed closely the trends in  the
production and prices for sugar, which continues to be the most important economic activity. The
collapse and stagnation of sugar prices in the 1980s, the impact of the Gulf war and the effect of
Hurricane Hugo on the 1990 sugar crop are reflected  in the adverse terms of trade shocks in the period
1980-92.  The impact of these shocks was mitigated  by the fact that St. Kitts exported nearly all of its
sugar output to the United Kingdom and the United States under quota arrangements  and at prices
higher than those in the free market. Favorable NFS and export volume shocks  also partially offset the
adverse terms of trade shocks. After a negative real GDP growth rate in 1983, the country grew on
average  at 6 percent in the period 1985-92.
Responses. The diversification  of the economy played a crucial role in helping St.
Kitts to navigate  through the 1980s  and the beginning  of the 1990s. In the 1980s  St. Kitts recorded the
highest growth rate (7.3 percent) in the tourism and services  sector among all the countries considered
in this study (see Table 2) while the agriculture sector declined by 2.8 percent. Only Trinidad and
Tobago had a  larger decrease in this sector. The import intensity measure turned positive at the
beginning of the 1990s  as a consequence  of the slowdown in the construction  activity and of a lower
demand for electronic equipment  from the United States caused by the recession in that country. On
average economic  compression  doesn't seem to have been an important  response to external shocks. In
1991 the ANEF measure turned negative for the first time in the period under analysis. This  is
explained  partially by the combined  effect of favorable and unfavorable  external shocks  in 1991-92  and
reflected  by the improvement  in the trade account and travel receipts.
A high share of GDI/GDP at an annual rate of 40 percent over the period has been
financed  by an almost equal combination  of foreign and domestic savings, both private and public. The
overall public sector balance  deficit declined  after 1987 and turned into a surplus in 1992. The share of
total external debt, mainly concessional,  at the end of the period was around 20 percent of GNP. St.
Kitts is the first OECS country  to graduate from IDA funding.30
Table 11  St. Kifts and Nevis
EX=ERNAL SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
(Petceat ol GDP)
1980  1951  1982  1983  1984  1985  1988  1987  1988  1989g  1990  1991  1992
TermsofTrade  -0.7  3.3  3.5  1.1  0.6  0.0  -0.3  7.4  51  1.3  3.9  -0.8  1.4
Nonrad  orS mvcasEftet  -0.7  00  0.0  0-1  0.2  0.3  -0.1  -1.0  .14  *0.3  -07  0.4  -0.5
ExpolrVdume  0.1  1.2  27  0.8  -1.5  0.3  .0.1  -0.6  -1.2  -0.4  0.1  0.1  0.1
Inutre  tRate  00  00  00  00  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Totbl  -1.2  4.4  6.2  -0.3  -0.6  0 6  -0.5  5.9  2.5  0.5  3.2  -0.3  1.0
AddbonaI DebtServ,ce  0.0  1.7  1.9  1.7  2.8  1.5  11  1.5  2.1  3.0  3.2  2.3  1.2
TOTAL (Total  AddMonal  Dest Serlce)  -1.2  6 1  8.2  1.5  2.2  2.1  0 6  7 4  4.6  3.5  6.5  1.9  2.2
Addina"  tNtExternalFinancnrg  12.0  4.9  3.3  11.7  -5.8  2.7  7.1  101  10.1  11.2  0.1  -3.6  -2.6
Export Expansion  -2.1  1.2  -1.1  0.8  2.3  -0.3  3.3  4.7  -3.5  -1.4  -1.7  0.5  1.1
importIntaiy  -11.1  00  7.4  -15.6  9.7  0.2  -9.0  -6.5  0.8  -8.8  5.3  53  27
Econosre Compression  0.0  0.0  -1.4  4.6  -4.0  -0.6  -0.7  -0.9  -2.8  0.5  2.8  -0.2  1.0
TOTAL  -1.2  6.1  8.2  1.5  2.2  2.1  0.6  74  4.6  3.5  6.5  1 9  2.2
80-80  .87402  80-52
AVwup  Sdsv  Alw_g  SdSv  Avow"  Sdrv
External  Shsockes
Tems of Trade  0.8  1 9  3 0  3.0  1.8  2.6
NonratorService  Effrea  0.0  03  -06  0.6  -0.3  05
Export Voume  0.5  13  -0.3  0.5  01  10
IntrersIt Rale  00  0.0  0.0  0.0  00  00
Total  1.2  2.9  2.1  2.2  16  2.5
AcOtwou! DebtSwrvice  1.5  09  2.2  0.8  19  09
TOTAL(TotaleAddlofnalDebtService)  28  3.2  44  2.2  3.5  2.8
.3.r.l.irmnce  Mbasure
Addional  Not Extemal Financing  5.1  61  4.2  7.0  4.7  6.2
ExportExpansion  06  1.9  -0.1  2.8  0.3  2.3
import  lntwtiy  -2.6  986  0.1  5.5  -1.4  7.8
EconomicComprexsion  -0.3  26  01  1.9  -01  2.2
TOTAL  2.8  32  4.4  2.2  3.5  2.8
Sources:  Appendix 2
SELECTED  ECONOMIC  VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) \1  3.9  51  6.3  -1.1  9.0  5.6  6.3  6.8  9.8  67  3.0  6.8  5.0
INFLATION(%)  \2  17.7  10.5  59  2.3  2.7  2.6  00  0.9  0.2  5.1  4.2  42  2.9
GROSS  DOMESTIC  INVESTMENT  (% of GDP) \3  38.2  30.2  34.0  37.2  30.2  30.3  27.3  33.6  56.6  58.8  55.3  41  5  36.8
NATIONALSAVINGS(%ofGOP)  14  23.1  210  22.6  77  24.9  25.1  244  23.9  354  26.5  25.7  24.5  25.1
FOREIGN SAVINGS  (% of GDP) IS  15 1  9.2  114  29.5  5.3  5.2  2 9  9 7  21.2  32.3  29.6  17 0  11 7
PUBLIC  SECTOR BALANCE  (% of GDP) \6  -23 7  -11 4  -9 6  -9.4  -3 0  -11.5  -2.9  -2.7  .11.5  -5 3  -0.9  -1.0  3.7
REER  (1980=100) %7  100.0  103.3  106.1  107.3  109.3  1089  1051  986  923  944  89.9  89.5  89.3
FOREIGN DIRECTINVESTMENT (% of GDP) %8  2.1  1 6  22  22.6  3 1  23  8.0  8.3  10.5  288  30.6  126  12.4
ODAFLOWS(%ofGDP).9  12.9  67  5.3  47  51  5.8  58  6.9  110  92  49  4.3  4.3
TOTALEXT. DEBT(%ofGNP)l10  17.8  148  14.3  15.6  15.1  16.7  18.3  19.8  21.7  240  24.2  25.7  25.6
INTERESTITOTALEXT. DEBT (%) 111  1.2  1.2  2.3  2.1  2.8  2.3  30  2.8  2.3  28  4.0  32  2.8
LIFE EXPECTANCY 112  64  66  68
INFANT  MORTALITY RATE 113  45  40  34
PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC. (% of GNP)  5.1  4 6  6 1  6.5  4 1  4  4  3 8  3.5
1  Factor  cost
2  Annuan  rate of inflabon based on CPI. IMF. IFSBA from BESD database.
3  Nabonel  authonbes IMF and IBRD
4  National  Sangs  = Gross Domesbc  Saving . Net Factor Income  * Current Transhers.World  Bank  (1994) p 175
5  Foreign  Savings 5  Gross Domestic Investment - National Savings World Bank (1994) p.175
6  Public Sector Overall Balance. World Bank (19948)
7  Rul  Effectve Exchange  RatePenotd Average.IMF
8  orld Bank (1994a)
9  Nel disbursements  of ODA from  all sources = ODA Loans net . Grants.  Grants inchude  technical cooperation grants. (OECD)
10 Total Extemal  Debt (% of GNP). World Bank. World Debt Tables. DX.
11 Total Intarest Payments  to Total Extemal Debt (%)  World  Bank. World Debt Tables.  DX
12  Life  expectancy at birth  (years)
13 Per 1000 live births31
5.  St. Lucia
Shocks.  St. Lucia as well as St. Kitts and Nevis was able to  navigate through the
turbulent decade of  the  1980s maintaining high  level of growth and  sound fiscal policies. The
development  of tourism along with banana exports provided a measure of diversification  in production
which helped to sustain output. St. Lucia is the major OECS  banana exporter.
St. Lucia started the decade of the 1980s  facing a disastrous scenario. Terms of trade
shocks, driven by fluctuations  in export and oil prices, disruptions in the banana production following
tropical storms, and a worldwide recession had a strong impact on this island. Growth slowed down
(negative 0.8 percent in  1980) and inflation rose to double digit levels (20 percent in  1980). Then
improvements  in the terms of trade and in the world economy  helped the country to restore high levels
of growth and to slow inflation. The vulnerability  of this country was again clear at the beginning of
the 1990s when terms of trade deteriorated and world economy growth turned sluggish. This time,
however, inflation  was kept under control. Overall, the impact  of the fluctuations  in banana  prices was
cushioned  by preferential  access to the UK/EU  market.
ReSDOnSge.  The evidence for St. Lucia suggests that policy responses were adequate
throughout the entire period. Gains in export share (annual average of 2.5 percent) compensated  the
increase in  imports (annual average of  1.1 percent) and the GDP expansion (negative economic
compression  of 0.4 percent). This also explains the lowest overall ANEF among OECS countries. It
seems that a mix of expenditure  switching policies, together with expenditure expansion, instead of
reduction, have been successfully  used in this country. The high volatility of these policy responses
reflects the difficulty  in steering the course of a small open economy. St. Lucia remains vulnerable  to
external shocks  because  of its narrow resource  base and the effects  of natural calamities  on agricultural
production.
Banana export earnings and tourism receipts contributed substantially to government
revenues  and to the financing  of domestic  activities. In addition, St. Lucia relied on constant flows of32
Table 12  St. Lucia
EXT=RNAL SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE  MEASURES
(parcent  ol ODP}
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Exhtrnal Slock
Terms  of  Trae  56  2.3  1.9  -0.7  0.4  0.0  -0.5  7.1  07  -0.3  3.6  -2.1  5.1
NonfactorServices Efect  -19  -0.1  04  03  0.2  03  -0.1  -1.0  .15  -04  -09  0.5  -0.5
ExponVotume  01  06  1.6  05  -1.2  02  -0.1  -07  .13  -07  01  0.2  0.2
InltnaaRate  0.0  00  00  00  O  00  0.0  0.0  0.0  0°0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  3.7  28  39  0.1  -06  0.5  -0.7  5.4  -21  -14  2.8  -1.3  4.7
AodibonalDeblServ,c  0.0  1.9  1.9  09  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.6  0.6  1.5  06  0.6
TOTAL (Total +Addltlonal  Debt Servicel  3 7  4 7  5.8  10  -0.5  0 9  -0.3  5.6  -1  5  -0.9  4 3  -0  7  5.4
P  rformance  MIjsuteut
Addibonal Net Extemal Finanang  12.8  3.5  -3.9  -7.7  4.7  0.5  -1.6  6.1  -0.8  12.6  -7.6  8.1  -12.5
Export Expawon  -4.0  2.8  5.0  2.7  0.3  3.2  10.4  1.0  3.0  -5.5  2.6  -6.0  17.2
ImportIntensity  -5.1  -1.8  6.1  76  -4.1  -0.9  -5.3  -4.0  -0.2  -9.5  71  -6.1  1.8
EconomicCompreesson  0.0  0.2  -13  -1.5  -1.5  -1.9  -3.8  24  -3.5  18  2.2  3.3  .1.1
TOTAL  37  47  58  10  -0.5  09  -0.3  56  .15  -09  4.3  -0.7  5.4
80-88  8742  80-92
AWI  Sd*  A  _eag  Sdv  Aw_e  Sdt
ExtNI  Shmk
Tems of  Trade  13  2.2  2.4  3.5  1.8  2.8
Norfacor  ServKc  Elftd  -0.1  0.8  -0.6  0.7  -0 4  0.8
Export Volute  0.3  0.8  -0.4  0 6  0.0  0.8
lnbastatRate  0.0  0.0  00  00  00  0.0
Total  14  2 0  1.3  3.4  1.4  2.6
Additional  DebtService  0.8  0.6  07  0.4  0.7  0.6
TOTAL fTotslAddildonalDebtSwvIc*l  2.2  2.5  2.0  34  2.1  2.8
P  rlormanice MiasuMl
AddibontioN tExtemnalFinancirg  1.2  6.7  1.0  97  1.1  7.8
Expot  Expaon  2.9  4.4  2.0  8.4  2.5  6.3
Impo  lntmiaity  -0.5  5.3  -18  6.0  -1.1  54
Ecoromic Compression  -1.4  1.3  0.8  26  8044  2.2
TOTAL  2.2  2.5  2.0  3.4  2.1  2.8
Sources:  Appwndix  2
SELECTED  ECONOMIC VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDP GROWTH RATE  (%) 1I  -0.8  1.2  3.0  4.0  5.0  8.0  14.9  1.7  12.7  8.5  3.9  1.6  6.8
INFLATIONI%)  12  19.5  15.1  4.6  1.5  1.2  1.4  2.0  7.6  0.8  4.1  4.7  5.7  5.1
GROSSDOMESTICINVESTMENT(%ofGDP)  X3  34.3  34.2  29.1  18.7  197  21.0  21.2  20.7  25.0  29.1  25.8  25.5  24.0
NATIONALSAVINGS(%doGDP)  \4  9.5  8.3  7.0  11.8  7.6  12.5  192  15.6  19.4  12.1  11.7  7.3  9.1
FOREIGNSAVINGSI%  ofGDP)\5  24.8  25.9  22.1  6.9  12.1  8.5  20  51  5.6  17.0  14.1  18.2  149
PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE (% o GDP)  16  -7.1  -5.5  -7.8  -5*4  -4.7  -2.8  *3.2  -07  -01  -2.5  -2.7  -2.7  -2.5
REER(1980.100)  \7  100.0  109.7  112.5  114.2  118.7  117.0  110.0  107.9  101.0  102.9  979  998  102.2
FOREIGNDIRECTINVESTMENT(%doGDP)18  23.2  251  16.1  5.6  6.1  7.8  6.3  5.8  9.0  8.8  11.4  13.5  15.7
ODA FLOWS (% of  GDP)1\9  6.4  785  5.0  3.9  2.9  3.2  4.5  3.8  5 4  4.9  3.0  5.3  6.0
TOTALEXT.DEBT(%ofGNP)  110  140  123  130  13.5  134  10.8  12.4  16.5  16.1  18.0  21.3  20.4  21.8
INTERESTITOTAL EXT. DEBT(%) \11  2.9  26  3.5  3.2  2.5  30  2.8  3.4  3.8  4.4  3.9  5.3  4.5
LIFE EXPECTANCY \112  69  70  70
INFANT  MORTALITY RATE  \113  25  21  19
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC. (% of GNP)  6.2  7  7.8  7.2  7.5  72  7.8  8.6
1  Fatdor coat
2  Annual rate of inflabon based on CPI  IMF. IFSBA brm BESD  database.
3  National au6honbes.  IMF and IBRD
4  Nabonal Savings  = Gross Domestic Saving * Net Factor income + Current Trsnsfers.World Bank  (1994) p. 175
S  Foreign Swings  Gross Domesbelnvestnent  - National Savings World  Bank (1994) p.175
6  Public Sector Ovrall Balane.  World Bank (1994a)
7  Real Effecbve Exchenge Rate.Penod  Avrage.  IMF
8  Wold  Bank  (1994e)
9  Net dbursaements of ODA from all sources = ODA Loans net . Grants.  Grants indude lectricat  coopeabion grants. (OECD)
10 Tota  Extemal Debt  (% of GNP)  World Bank. World Debt  Tables. DX.
11 Tobtl Interest Payments  to Total Extemal Debt (%). World Bank. World Debt Tables. DX.
12 Life expectancy St birth (yearsI
13  Per lOO1  live  births33
Official Development  Assistance  and foreign  direct investments  in tourism  and manufacturing.  Despite
a widening in the current account  balance, the overall balance  of payments improved in the first years
of this decade.
The total external debt, mainly concessional,  as a percentage of GNP increased from
14 percent in 1980  to 22 percent in 1992.  The increase  in the interest over debt ratio from 2.9 percent
in 1980 to 5 percent in 1991-92  is explained  by the increase in borrowing at commercial  ternms  which
took place in recent years.
6.  St. Vincent  and the Grenadines
Shocks. Bananas  and tourism  are the main industries  of these islands. St. Vincent, like
St. Lucia, suffered terms of trade shocks of a certain magnitude (around 5 percent of GDP) in the
beginning of the 1980s. A major volcanic eruption in 1979 followed  by hurricanes destroyed part of
the local banana industry. Therefore, St. Vincent could not take advantage of the increase in banana
prices. Real GDP increased at an average annual rate of 5.8 percent in the period 1980-92.
In  1992 the banana industry contributed about 48  percent of  merchandise export
earnings and employed two-thirds of all agricultural workers, still the single most important economic
activity in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  Therefore, these islands are highly vulnerable to external
shocks caused  by weather conditions  and by the removal  of preferential  agreements.
Responses.  Export expansion  gains in the 1980s, together with increased revenues
from tourism, seem to have offset the negative  impacts  of external shocks, and financed  the increase in
imports up to  1988 (import intensity was positive in the period 1989-92). The fall in imports after
1988 is explained  by the completion  of several major public investment  projects, the closure of certain
industries, and decline in imports  of inputs for the banana industry. High volume of ANEF, additional
financing, was required to temper the impact  of the largest shocks  in 1980 and 1989. Since  most of the
external  financing was represented  by grants or concessional  borrowing, the debt service has remained
manageable.  In the period 1980-92  the average level of GDI was around 30 percent of GDP, equally34
Table  13  St.  Vincent-Grenadines
EXIERNAL  SHOCKS  AND  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES
(u,en  .1GP low  i9ei  1iw2  196  lOSS  196  Im  IUs  iou  lose  ¶9o0  iggi  iwo
TeM  d  Trad  5.7  2.8  5.6  .0.4  1.9  1.5  .1.0  8.8  .16  .14  3.8  -2.1  4.8
N'.botorSEra  h  Ejed  -1.5  40.1  _.0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  .0.1  .0.3  .0.1  .0.4  0.1  .0.1
ExpmtVahme  0.1  0.6  2.0  0.9  .2.4  0.5  -0.3  .1.2  -1.6  -1.2  0.1  0.3  0.2
flimel  R_tA  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
TeM  4.3  3.4  7.7  0.6  .0.4  2.0  .1.3  7.5  -3.7  -2.7  3.3  .1.7  4 9
Additional O  Sw4ie  0.0  1.7  0.0  .0.2  .0.7  -1.1  .1.4  .1.1  -0.2  .1.0  .0.4  -0.5  .0.1
TOTALTrai+Additinal  DebtSme  4.3  .1  7.7  0.4  .1.  1  0.9  -2.6  6.4  .3.9  .3.6  3.0  -2.1  4.6
AdmioneltmExammalulnlrc  12.7  -10.0  2.1  .4.7  .8.6  4.2  2.7  12.7  J8.9  6.3  43.3  4.0  -7.9
E19M  Expanon  .4.9  13.0  10.3  10.1  11.2  10.2  30  .6.0  9.2  -12.4  2.3  .10.1  7.1
h  hym qutr  .1.6  4.9  *8.0  4.3  4.4  -0.5  40.9  0.0  .2.5  3.6  4.2  1.3  4.7
E  Iati1Cornpri  0.4  -2.8  -1.5  -1.6  .0.1  0.4  .1.5  .0.3  .1.6  .0.1  -0.3  2.8  1.0
TOTAL  4.3  5.1  7.7  0.4  -1.1  0.9  -2.6  6.4  -3.9  -3.6  3.0  -2.1  4.6
40644  .487-
A  _W  Sdw  Agony  Sd  _A  J_
Tagmeof  Trad  2.3  2.6  2.0  4.4  2.2  3.4
NorIV.SwvcsshEdact  .0.2  0.6  .0.1  0.2  .0.2  0.4
Export Voklw  0.2  1.4  -0.6  0.9  40.1  1.2
ldwas Rat  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Tom  2.3  3.1  1.3  4.6  1.9  3.7
Adill"  Debt SerAce  .0.2  1.0  45  0.4  .0.4  0.6
TOTAL (TaTId.lAdorial  Dow Servtcel  2.1  3.7  0.6  4.5  1.5  4.0
Pwfnnce  Mossu
Adft"  Not  EMnul Flnwxft  -2.8  8.2  0.3  8.5  .1.3  8.1
ExpoltE  r. IF  , ,7.7  9.3  -1.8  9.1  3.4  ¶0.0
I P  lo  k*uy  .1.9  3.9  1.9  2.8  .0.  3.6
Eww,SConprsemon  .1.0  1.2  0.2  1S  .044  1.4
TTAL  2.1  3.7  0.8  4.5  1.5  4.0
Soure": Appendx  2
SELECTED  ECONOMIC  VAMAULES
1960  19el  19 2  19  64  1965  1966  196?  1966  196  i9o  1991  1w92
GDP  GROWrH  RATE  (%) \1  3  4  7.2  5.2  5.8  5.6  4.5  7.2  6.3  8.6  7.2  7.1  3.0  4.9
INFLATION  (%)  2  17.2  12.7  7.2  5.5  2.7  2.1  1.0  3.3  0.2  2.6  7.6  5.6  3.4
GROSSDOMESTICINVESTMENT(%ofGDP)  %3  39.3  32.7  28.5  24.7  27.9  28.3  29.6  32.6  31.0  29.4  31.5  31.3  31.2
NATIONALSAVINGS(%ofGDP)  U4  15.7  24.9  15.6  11.3  20.4  22.5  20.9  9.7  15.5  11.2  1868  10.9  19.1
FOREIGNSAVINGS(%doGOP)\S  22.6  7.8  12.7  13.4  7.5  5.6  8.7  22.9  15.5  16.2  12.7  20.4  12.1
PUBLIC  SECTOR  BALANCE  (%of  GDP)  16  .25.6  *13.2  -11.1  *10.9  -0.6  -0.9  .49  .4.4  4.6  -2.5  -4.1  .6.5  -57
REER  (19060100)  %7  1W.0  105.7  109.5  113.5  115.3  114.2  112.3  107.1  100.  100.8  98.2  99.3  99.5
FOREIGNDIRECTINVESTMENT(%doGDP)\8  1.9  0.7  0.7  2.2  1.4  1.6  5.8  3.5  5.7  6.1  3.9  4.8  4.1
OOAFLOM.(%ofGDP)  16.4  12.7  9.0  5.  3.9  4.9  9.7  9.4  10.3  6.6  7.6  6.9  6.6
TOTALEXT.DET1(%ofGNP)\10  167  26.7  26.1  27.8  25.0  24.7  25.3  304  32.1  32.4  31.6  32.0  28.8
INTERESTITOTALEXT.  DEBT(%) 11  2.8  2.5  3.3  2.7  5.6  5.2  4.5  3.4  3.1  3.4  3.0  2.9  2.9
LIFE  EXPECTANCY  \12  66  69  71
INFANT  MORTALITY  RATE  X13  31  25  20
PUB8CEXPENDITUREONEDUC.  (%ofGNP)  6  5.9  57  5.8  6  6.1
I  *^b  Sa  (Bg1904a)
2  AiS nnu  of  Willso  based  aon  CPI.  IMF.  IFSBA  from  BESD  d  dAbse.
3  Nol  sudloitbS.  IMF nd IBRD
4  Nonal  Savigs * GiDs Domestic  Saving  * Net  Factor  Inconm  * Cwrent  Taaftx.\itd  blds  (1994)  p. 175
S Fael  Savngs  * Grou Donec  InvestMnt  - Naonal Saings. WoMd aS*  (1994)  p.175
6  Pubic  Sector  Ovll  Balance  before  grnts. Wabd  Bank 19948)
7  Roel  Eltedv  Exchange  Rot.Pe1iod  Avenrg.IMF
8  VddBak*  (9I4l)
9  Ne dhburaww  of  ODA  frm au  souces  = ODA  Loons  nei  * GrNl.  Grant side  ed  -I  cepoe  ras.  (OECO)
10 Total  Extrnl  Debt  (%  of GNP).  Would  Bank.  World  Debt  Tobles.  DX.
11 Total  Intemt Paymernt  to  Total  Externl Debt  (%).  Wotd Bank.  World  DebtTabs. DX.
12 Lfexe,tency  atbirflt (years)
13 Per  lOCtive bos35
financed by national and foreign savings, particularly remittances. The majority of investments  were
channeled towards transport, communications,  and construction sectors. Public finances have been
managed  prudently and most of the loss-making  public enterprises  have been privatized.
Most of St. Vincent external debt, 29 percent of GNP in  1992, is on concessional
terms (see Figure 2). The interest to debt ratio was at the relatively  low level of around 3 percent at the
beginning  and the end of the period under analysis.
B.  Barbados,  Jamaica, Dominican  Republic,  Trinidad  and Tobago.
1.  Barbados
Barbados is in terms of size, geographical  location  and population very similar to the
OECS islands. Barbados, together with Antigua, has the highest GNP per capita (6240 US dollar in
1993)  among  all the countries here considered.
Shocks.  The adverse terms of trade shocks which characterized  the beginning  of the
1980s were partially compensated  by  favorable nonfactor service effects in  1980 and  1981. This
partially reflects the fact that Barbados  at the end of the 1970s  was already a diversified economy  based
on tourism, sugar exports and a growing manufacturing  sector, mainly clothing and food processing.
However, the world recession,  the fall in sugar prices, the increased  competition  in tourism from other
islands with lower prices affected real output in the first part of the decade. Only in  1986 output
growth went back to  the 1980 level, after being negative in  1982 and  1983 (see Table 14). This
vulnerability  to external events  played a crucial role in shaping  Barbados' economic  fortune after 1989.
Again real GDP growth turned negative  in 1990 and inflation  accelerated  in 1991. However, the latter
was already under control in 1993.
Responses.  In  the first period under analysis, the export expansion and  import
intensity  measures  were opposite  in sign, contributing  to restore balance  of payments  equilibrium  in36
Table  14  Barbados
EXTERNAL  SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
(percet  of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Externnd  Shoct
TermsofTrade  34  1.6  21  -0.5  06  -01  -0.1  35  -0.8  0.0  2.1  30  01
Nontacor Servces Efe  -4 2  -0 2  -1  0.6  0 3  0.5  -0  1  -1 3  -07  -0.8  -2 3  -16  -0 3
Export Volura  0.1  0°5  11  0.5  -15  0.3  -0  -04  -0.6  -0.3  0.0  01  0.1
IntrareStRate  00  00  -0  2  -0.2  01  -0.2  -01  00  0.0  0.1  -01  -02  -0.2
Total  -07  1 8  4 1  0.4  -05  05  -05  1 9  -2.0  -1.0  -0  2  1.3  -0.3
Additional DebtSermce  00  04  1 1  00  -04  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1  04  0.5  0.2  0.3
TOTAL (Tobal  +Addttlonal Debt Servlce)  -0 7  2 2  5 2  0 4  -0 9  0 8  -0.3  2 2  -2.0  -0 7  0.3  1.5  -0.1
PertonMance Measures
Addibonal  Not Extemal Financng  2 6  6.2  -8.1  -4 0  7.1  0.8  0.5  -3 0  3 4  2.5  -2.7  3.5  -15  6
Export Expansion  -2 3  0 4  9.2  9 9  -2 7  4.4  -1.5  -2.  B  -2.0  -1 0  -0.3  -5.4  3.7
Import Intenity  -07  -8.3  -1 1  -64  41  4.9  3.3  8.6  -31  -20  0.8  0.2  10.4
Economic Compression  -0 4  3 8  5.2  0.9  -1.3  -0 4  -2.5  -0.6  -0.3  -0.1  2.5  3 2  1.4
TOTAL  -07  22  52  04  -09  08  -0.3  2.2  -2.0  -07  03  15  -0.1
80-a  87-92  8042
Aswge  Sdev  Aver  Sdev  A4  Sde-v
External Shocks
rems  of Trade  1 0  1 4  1.3  1.8  1.1  1 5
Nonractor  Services Effe  -0  3  1 8  -1 2  0 7  -0 7  1 4
Exporl Vodlue  01  0.8  -0.2  0 3  0 0  0.6
Intrerest  Rite  -- °  01  0 0  01  -01  01
Total  0 7  1 7  -0.  1  1 5  0 4  1 6
Addibonal  Debt Service  0 2  0.5  0 3  0 1  0.3  0.3
TOTAL (Total +AddItional  Debt Service)  1 0  2 1  0 2  1.5  0.6  1.8
Performance  Measures
Additonal  Net External Financng  0.7  5  4  -2 0  7 3  -0  6.2
Export Expansaon  1.2  5.9  -1.3  3.0  01  4.8
ImporttntDty  -1.8  4.8  25  5  6  0.2  55
Economic Compression  0.8  2.8  1.0  1.6  0 9  2.2
TOTAL  10  2.1  02  15  0.6  18
Sources  Appendix 2
SELECTED ECONOMIC  VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDP GROWTH RATE (%)  4 7  -3 2  -5.0  0.4  36  1.1  51  2 5  3.5  3.6  -3.3  -5.4  -2 9
INFLATION (%)  12  14  4  14  6  10.3  5.2  4 7  3.9  1.3  3.3  4.9  6 2  3.1  6.3  6.1
GROSSDOMESTICINVESTMENT(%ofGDP)\3  25.3  27.6  22.6  199  162  15.4  16.0  16.0  175  184  183  15.6  13.9
NATIONALSAVANGS(%ofGDP)  \4  22.4  153  18.1  15.1  178  19.8  15.7  14.9  188  20.0  15.8  16.5  18.3
FOREIGN SAVINGS (% of GDP) 15  2.9  123  4.5  48  -1.6  -44  0.3  1.1  -13  -16  2.5  -09  -44
PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE  (  of GDP)  \6  -3.7  -5.  4  4  -1 7  -1.9  -51  4 7  -5.6  -2.1  -01  -7 1  0 0  1.8
REER (1980=100) \7  100.0  108.9  1187  128.8  136.7  127.6  120.9  1138  1135  1173  1173  1135  1127
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT I% of GDP) \8  0 3  0.8  04  0.2  0 1  0.2  04  0.3  0.7  0.3  06  1.2  1 0
ODAFLOWS(%ofGDPI\9  1 7  1 8  1 3  1 8  07  0.6  0.3  0.4  0.2  0 1  0.2  0.2  01
TOTAL EXT  DEBr(%ofGNP)\lo  198  246  338  556  345  38.4  454  41.1  470  386  402  40.3  407
INTEPEST/ TOTAL EXT. DEBT (%  11M1  68  8.2  7.4  52  8.3  6 1  7.0  56.  64  75  7.1  7 1  6.9
LIFE EXPECTANCY \12  73  74  75
INFANT MORTALITY  RATE 113  17  12  10
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC (% of GNP)  6.5  6.1  5  7  5 8  5 5  6  5.3  5.9  5.4
1  World  Bank (1994a)
2  Annual rate of infatDon  Dased Oil CPI  IMF. IFSBA from BESD dataoase
3  Nabonal authontbes.  IMF and IBRD
4  Nabonal Savings  = Gross Domestic Saving - Net Factor Income t  Current Transters Wortd Bank (1994) p. 175
5  Foreign Savongs  = Gross Domestc investment -National Savings World Bank (1994) p.175
6  Public Secto. Overall Balance World Bank (1991ta)
7  Real Efte&ive Exchange Rate.Penod  Average IMF
8  World Bank  (1994a)
9  Net disbfursements  of ODA from all sources  = ODA Loans net . Grants.  Grants include  technical cooceration grants (OECD)
10 Total Extemal Debt (% of GNP) World Bank. World Debt Tables. OX
11 Total Interest Payments  to Total Extemal Debt (%¾)  World Bank. World Debt Tables. DX
12 Lite expectancy at binh (years)
13  Per 1000 live births37
1984. In the following  period, 1987-92,  the situation was the reverse with a decrease in imports per
unit of output and export growth below the world increase. Economic  compression  was relevant in the
two periods 1981-83 and 1990-92  in which Barbados experienced negative real output growth rates.
One of the  recurrent problems in the Barbados economy is  associated with the  loss of external
competitiveness  with regard to other Caribbean competitors.  This was the case in both the two major
crises anticipated by  adverse external shocks at the beginning of both the 1980s and  1990s. The
improvement  in tourism competitiveness  and the consequent  economic recovery in the period 1986-89
is partially explained  by the depreciation  of the US dollar to which the exchange  rate has been pegged
since 1975. However, over the entire period 1980-92, Barbados' real effective exchange rate had the
largest appreciation among all the countries considered in this study. Given the higher income per
capita compared  to the other islands Barbados cannot  compete with the other islands in terms of lower
wages. However, the lower cost of services and utilities in Barbados might compensate the higher
labor cost component  in the future.
2.  Jamaica
Shocks.  In the period 1980-92  the annual average value for terms of trade shocks was
0.6  percent of GDP but the cumulative effect of additional net external financing increased steadily so
that  the  total  shock  averaged  2.6  percent  of  GDP.  While  adverse  shocks  in  the  1970s  were  due
primarily  to the two oil  shocks,  in the early  1980s there  was a different  pattern  as depressed  global
markets were somewhat compensated for  by favorable movements in the terms of trade.  Towards  the
end of the decade the Gulf War again had a major negative impact on Jamaica. This time it affected not
only the terms of trade  but also had  a major depressing  effect on sectors such as tourism.  The adverse
oil shocks in the 1970s and again in the late 1980s were supply-side shocks.  Based on the experience in
many of  the  industrial  countries  it  is generally  accepted  that  the  appropriate  response  would  have
included higher gasoline taxes. This would help keep fiscal accounts in balance and reduce the need for
external financing. In order to maintain competitiveness  one might also try to achieve a somewhat
lower increase for intermediate  inputs for industry. Depressed  global markets for Jamaica's exports in
the early 1980s  could have been addressed  by stronger export promotion efforts. This would require a
depreciation of the real exchange rate.38
Table 15  Jamaica
EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
(percent  df  SDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Extemnal  Sthocke
Twmseof  Trade  4.8  2.8  -1.5  -1.1  *0.3  *0.8  3.9  3.4  0.7  1.4  2.7  -1.7  1.3
Nomdactor  Serv5 s Effed  -0.4  -01  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.7  -1.2  -0.4  -0.2  -0.8  0.5  -0.3
ExponVokne  0.1  1'0  2.3  0.6  -1.8  0.4  -0.1  -0.5  -1.1  -0.5  0.1  0.3  0.3
IntrerestRate  02  0.3  -04  -0.4  0.3  -0.9  -0.8  0.1  0.3  0.3  -0.2  -06  -0.7
Total  4.7  4.0  0.7  -0.8  -1.6  -1.0  -3.9  1.9  -0.6  0.9  1.7  -1.6  0.6
Addibonal  DbtSeyvies  0.0  0-7  2.3  2.4  5.0  3.5  2.9  2.3  2.7  3.1  3.5  2.9  2.1
TOTAL (Total +AddMonal  Debt Service)  4.7  4.7  3.0  16  3 4  2.5  -1.0  4.2  2.1  4.1  5.2  1.4  2.8
Perfotmance  Mcsmes
Addibonal Ne Extemnal  Financing  4.3  13.8  9.7  8.5  -10.3  13.2  -4.3  6.8  5.5  10.2  -0.5  -2.3  1.0
Exporn  Exprion  -1.1  13  -a.0  0.0  -1.6  -10.3  -1.5  2.9  0.0  1.9  1.5  -2.7  0.5
Import Intenity  0.2  -843  0.8  -5.3  14.3  -3.8  5.9  -3.2  -2.7  4.5  4 3  4.4  0.0
EconomicCompression  1.3  -2.0  -1.4  -1.6  0.9  3.4  -1.1  -2.4  -0.6  -1.5  -0.1  1.9  1.1
TOTAL  47  47  3.0  1.6  3.4  2.5  -1.0  4.2  2.1  4.1  5.2  1.4  2.6
11-se  a7-82  a2
Awave  Sdv  Awaoe  Sd.v  A  _wge  Sd&V
Extmanl Shocks
Terms of Trade  0.0  2.9  1.3  1.8  0.6  2.4
NonfaectorServceasEflect  0.2  0.3  -04  0.8  -0.1  0.5
Export Votme  0.4  1.2  -0.2  05  0.1  1.0
Intrest  Rate  -0.2  0 5  -0.1  0.4  -0.2  0 5
Total  0 3  31  0.5  1.3  04  2.4
Additonal  Debt Service  2 4  1.7  2.8  0.5  2.6  1.3
TOTAL(Total4AddltlonalDebtService)  27  2.0  3.3  1.5  3.0  1.7
PerformanCe ltamureM
Addibunsal  Net Extemal Financing  5.0  9.1  3.4  4.8  4.3  7.2
Expor  Expansion  -2.7  4.0  0.7  2.0  -1.2  3.8
Imponlntensty  0.5  7.6  -06  44  0.0  6.1
EconomicCompreBsion  -0.1  2.0  -0.3  1.6  -0.2  1.7
TOTAL  2 7  2.0  3 3  15  3.0  1.7
Sourres: Appendix 2
SELECTED  ECONOMIC VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  19m  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) \1  -5 8  2.5  1.1  2.3  -0.9  -4.6  1.7  6.2  2.9  6.9  5.7  0.3  1.2
INFLATION(%)  \2  27.3  12.7  6.5  11.6  27.8  25.7  15.1  6.7  8.3  14.3  22.0  51.1  77.3
GROSSDOMESTICINVESTMENT(%ofGOP)  3  159  20.3  20.9  22.2  23.1  25.3  18.5  22.3  22.5  17.2  19.7  20.1  20.4
NATIONALSAVINGS(%otGDP)  '4  10.4  9.8  86  100  9.2  7.3  14.9  15.8  21.4  5.3  9.2  118  21.2
FOREIGN  SAVINGS  (% ofGDP)  5  5 5  10.5  12.3  122  13.9  18.0  3.8  6.5  1 1  11.9  10.5  8.3  -0.8
PUBLIC SECTOR  EALANCE (%of GDP)  IS  -160  -16.5  -21.2  -15.9  -14.7  5.8  -5.3  -134  -6.6  -32  -0.4  2.3
REER  (1980=100) \7  100.0  102.8  107.0  103.0  74.6  64.2  68.5  66.5  66.4  675  55.0  59.0  52.3
FOREIGN  DIRECT INVESTMENT  (% of GDP) \8  1.0  -0 4  -0.5  -0.5  -0 5  -0.4  -0.2  1 8  -0.3  1.4  3.2  1.9  3.2
ODAFLOWS(%ofGDP)\9  4.9  62  6.1  5.6  7.2  8.4  7.0  5.5  5.4  65  64  4.5  40
TOTALEXT  DEBT(%ofGNP)\10  783  881  102.2  114.3  169.5  238.8  192.6  183.2  148.4  1295  128.3  150.2  157.1
INTEREST/TOTALEXT. DEST(%)  111  84  6.6  69  6.5  7.9  70  6.9  59  5.5  5.0  61  53  49
LIFE EXPECTANCY \12  71  73  74
INFANTMORTALITYRATE  t13  I8  17  14
PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC. (% of GNP)  69  7 1  73  7.5  5.2  5.4  47  4 1  4.8
1  World Bank (1994a)
2  Anmual  rate of inflation based on CPI. IMF. IFSBA from BESD database.
3  National auttonbes. IMF and IBRD
4  National Savings = Gross Domesbc  Savng  . Net Factor Income  * Current Transfers.Word Bank (1994) p. 175
5  Foreign Savings = Gross Domestic Investment -Natronal  Savings. World Bank (1994) p.175
6  Public Sector Overall Balance. World Bank (1  994a)
7  Real Eflective  Exchange Rate Penod Average.IMF
8  World Bank  (1994a)
9  Net disbursements  of ODA from  all sources = ODA Loans net = Grants.  Grants inlude  technical cooperation grants. (OECD)
10 Total Extemal Dabt (% of GNP)  World  Bank. World Debt Tables. DX
11 Total Interest Payments  to Total Extemal Debt (%)  World  Bank  World Debt  Tables. DX
12  Life  expectancy at birth (years)
13 Per 1000 live births39
ResDonses. In 1980, Jamaica  experienced  an adverse shock equivalent  to 5 percent of
GDP. The response  to this included  additional net external  financing  (ANEF) of 4 percent, a negative
export expansion  of  1I.1 percent, import intensity (reduced  use of importables  per unit of output) of
0.2 percent and economic  compression  of 1.3 percent of GDP. This response was very similar to the
response to the first oil shock: additional external borrowing, weak export performance, reduction of
imports and slowing down of economic  growth. For the first oil shock this type of policy could be
understood as it basically  treated the shock as temporary. However, after the second oil shock and the
adverse global situation of the early 1980s  it was essential  to adopt a different approach. This required
some stimulus for the supply-side, export encouragement  and definitely not the sharp increase in
external borrowing. This  mistake was further compounded in  the early  1980s by  expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy. This failure to take more restrictive measures such as effecting a  real
exchange  devaluation  laid the groundwork  for the sharp deterioration  in the rniddle of the decade that
forced the authorities to adopt more draconian measures. The lack of timely measures also had the
unfortunate side effect that when the global economy did  turn more favorable in  the mid-1980s,
Jamaica  was not well-positioned  to take advantage  of it. As the authorities  depended  unduly on external
borrowing to get through most external  shocks, the external  debt rose dramatically  to over 200 percent
of GNP in 1985. This burden severely limited the scope for policy initiatives. It also seems that this
increase in debt was not used for investment  purposes  but to a large degree to maintain consumption.
In some measures of income distribution one finds some improvement,  such as the sharp decline in
infant mortality rates from over 40 in 1971 to around 15 today.  However in education  the picture is
mixed.  Primary education  continues  to have enrollment  ratios around 100 and secondary levels ratios
are around 60 but the higher education  level ratios have fallen from over 6 to less than 2 in 1988 (see
World Bank 1994a).
Sumnu  Jamaica suffered severe adverse  shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s. An
appropriate response would have tried to compensate  for the loss in competitiveness.  The actual
response was inappropriate, with too much reliance on external borrowing, especially in the early
1980s, and little effort to stimulate the required supply-side  response. When the global environment40
turned favorable later in the 1980s, Jamaica was overly burdened by high debt and poor investment
choices  to take advantage  of the situation.
3.  Dominican  Republic
Shocks.  External  shocks were rather low throughout  the entire period under analysis.
The direct component, total shock less additional  debt service, was on average 0.3 percent of GDP.
Shocks varied from the favorable  fall in oil prices in the middle of the decade, which coincided  with
improved global market conditions for its principal commodity  exports, to the precipitous rise in oil
prices at the end of the decade due to the Gulf War (adverse terms of trade shock of 4 percent in
1990). Adverse impact on sugar exports was further compounded  with reduction in the U.S. sugar
quota. The low level of terms of trade shocks is explained by the Dominican Republic's diversified
export  base. Prices and production  of sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa and ferronickel moved in different
directions during the 1980s  and beginning  of the 1990s. In addition, tourism has been a very important
source of foreign exchange. The Dominican  Republic  is one of the most visited tourist destinations  of
the Caribbean. Negative  output growth in 1990 and 1991 was followed  by a strong recovery in 1992
(real GDP rose by 7 percent).
Responses. The second oil shock was not accompanied  by any favorable trends on
commodity  prices for Dominican  Republic exports so that an active response was called for.  Ideally
this would seek to restore some of the loss in competitiveness  due to the supply-side  shock. However
the government  did not pass on the oil price increase  to customers  and this led to deterioration in fiscal
accounts.  The authorities  sought to maintain  nominal  exchange  rate parity with the U.S. dollar with the
result that the real exchange rate deteriorated  and inflation  peaked (60 percent in 1990). Little action
was taken until the situation reached crisis proportions. In the late 1980s  the government finally took
action to stabilize the economy.
Lax fiscal policy in the late 1970s  and early 1980s  was facilitated  by a rapid increase in
external  debt. This rose quickly from around 30 percent in 1980 to 93 percent of GNP by 1988. The
adverse  external  shocks required  that overall demand  should have been curtailed while  the increasing41
Table  16  Dominican  Republic
EXTERNAL  SHOCKS AND PERFORMANCE  MEASURES
(peaent of GOP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Extml  S
Temns  of Trde  1 4  44  1.4  -0.9  0.7  -0.8  -3.0  5.9  -5.4  0.1  37  -14  1.5
Nonfcw  Servs  Effect  03  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  -11  -0.1  -0.8  -13  0  -0.2
ExportVoiLme  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.3  -04  0.2  -0.1  -04  -0.8  -0.3  0.0  01  0.1
Inbtrst  Rate  0 2  0.3  -0.3  -0.3  0 3  -05  -0.3  01  0 2  0.2  -01  -0.4  -0.5
Total  1.9  4.9  2.2  -0.9  0.2  -1.0  -3.0  4.5  46.1  -. 8  2.3  -0.8  0.9
Adionr  D_otServce  0.0  1.0  0.5  0.8  1.0  0.4  0.4  07  1.3  0.9  1.1  0.8  0.5
TOTAL (Tiat4  Additioril  Debt Serice)  1.9  5.9  2.6  -0 3  1.2  -0.5  -2.6  5.2  -4.9  0.0  3.4  0.0  1 4
AddNbonai  Net External Financing  6.8  -2.8  2.4  0.0  -4.0  2.6  2 7  4.8  -2.2  5.1  -0.3  1 4  71
Export Expeon  -3.9  7.4  -2.2  -0.1  4.2  -3.5  -2.6  1.4  -3.1  -2.4  -2.3  -1.2  -0.5
Inport Inany  -0.5  1.2  1.9  -0.2  0.2  -1.2  -2.4  0.7  0.1  -2.2  3.8  -1.0  -3.7
Economic Compresion  -0.3  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.9  1.6  -0.3  -17  0.4  -0.5  2.3  0.8  -1.5
TOTAL  1.9  5.9  2.6  -0.3  1.2  -05  -2.6  5.2  -4.9  0.0  3.4  0.0  14
so.la  87-92  802
A_Xp  Sdv  Amae  Sd*  A_o  SdV
Tema of Trade  0 5  2.3  0.7  4.0  0.8  3.0
NonractorSrvcssEfect  01  0.1  -04  0.8  -0.1  0.6
ExportVolume  0.1  0.5  -02  04  0.0  0.5
Inbrret  Rate  -0.1  0.3  -01  03  -0.1  03
Total  0.6  2.6  0.0  3.8  0.3  3.0
Addiioae  Dbti  Swvice  0 6  0.3  0.9  0.3  0.7  0.3
TOTAL (Total *Additonal  Debt Service)  1 2  2.7  0.9  3.5  1.0  3.0
Addional  NtExtamalFinanang  1.1  3.6  2.7  3.6  1.8  35
ExpO  ExpIion  -0.1  4.3  -1.4  1.6  -0.7  3.3
InnortIntbity  -0.2  1.4  -0.4  2.6  *0.3  2.0
EconomicCompreaion  0.3  0 7  0.0  1.5  0.2  1.1
TOTAL  1.2  2.7  0.9  3.5  1.0  3.0
SoIwces:  Appendix  2
SELECTED  ECONOMIC  VARIABLES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1964  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
GDPGROWTH RATE (%) \1  6.0  41  16  4.6  03  -2.6  3.2  79  0.7  4.1  -54  -09  76
INFLATION(%)  .2  16.8  7.5  7.6  4.8  27.0  37.5  9.7  15.9  44.4  45.4  59.4  53.9  4.6
GROSSDOMESTICINVESTMENT(%ofGDP)13  25.1  23.6  20.0  21.1  21.3  20.4  197  284  29.0  28.0  22.0  204  23.1
NATIONALSAVlNGS(%ofGDP)  W4  149  178  14.2  15.1  15.3  15.2  16.4  20.0  26.7  23.5  19.0  179  17.4
FOREIGNSAV1NGS(%ofGDP)  5  10.2  58  58  6.0  6.0  5.2  33  8.4  2.3  4.5  3.0  2.5  5.7
PUBLIC SECTOR  BALANCE (% of GDP)  8  -6 3  -61  -5.3  -5.0  -7.3  -3.4  -6 4  -4.7  -7 7  -7.2  -5.9  -0.7  0 5
REER(1980100)  %7  100.0  103.1  104.5  98.9  72.2  79.0  73.9  61.7  51.7  64.5  e6.5  71.1  71.5
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  (% of GDP) IS  0.9  1 1  0.0  0.3  0 7  0 8  0.9  1 8  2.3  1.6  1 9  2 0  2.3
ODAFLOWSI%ofGDP)19  19  14  1.9  1.5  3.8  46  1.7  2.5  2.5  2.1  1.3  0.8  0.7
TOTALEXT. DEBT(%ofGNP)  10  31.2  32.9  35.6  44.3  86.8  84.0  71.1  82.0  92.5  63.8  65.2  66.0  61.5
INTERESTJTOTALEXT. DEBT(%)  %I1  8.9  10.2  8.1  6.1  5.2  53  62  3.7  46  3.0  2.0  2.4  2.9
LIFE  EXPECTANCY %12  64  66  68
INFANT  MORTALITY RATE %13  50  44  41
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE  ON EDUC. (% of GNP)  2 3  2 3  2 3  2.3  1 7  1 5  1 4  1 3  1 3
1  H  rld Bank (1994a)
2  Annual  ra  of inflation based on CPI. IMF. IFSBA from BESD dat8base.
3  National authoKmboe.  IMF and IBRD
4  Nabonal  Sanngs * Gross Domesbc Savig  *  Net Factor Income . Cunent Transfers.World  Bank (1994) p. 175
5  Foreign Savings= Gross  Dormesc Invesmt  -Nabonal Savings. World Bank  (1994) p.175
6  Public Sctor  Overni  Balance  beo  grants  World Bank  (1994a)
7  Real  Effectve Exchange Rate Penod Averge.IMF
8  Vld  Bonk (1994a)
9  Net dsbumrements  of ODA from at  sources * ODA Loans net  + Grants. Grants include tachmnicl  cooperabon  grants. (OECD)
10 Total Extemal Debt (% of GNP) World Bank. World Debt  Tables. DX.
11 Total Interest Payments  to Total External Debt (%). World Bank. World Debt Tables. DX.
12  Lde  expeancy  at birth (years)
13 Per 1000 live births42
external  debt would require a policy tilt (e.g. relative  prices) in favor of the tradable  sector. Instead  the
overall consumption share stayed relatively constant at around 80 percent of  GDP. In  education,
secondary enrollment ratios did show some improvement  while infant mortality rate at around 41
percent by 1992 is one of the worst in the Caribbean  Region.
Sunmmar.  Unfavorable  external shocks in the 1970s were alleviated by favorable
price movements  in Dominican Republic's exports (largely sugar). Later in the decade the relatively
easy expedient  of external borrowing  was then used to cushion the shocks. This external indebtedness
was not used to any great extent to increase investment  levels or address social issues. This in turn
meant that Dominican  Republic  did not position  itself very well for sustained  growth during the period
1980-92.
4.  Trinidad  and Tobago
Shocks.  Trinidad and Tobago is an oil exporter so  that its fortunes were quite
different from most of the rest of the Caribbean. Over the 1970s  and at the beginning of the 1980s it
had favorable external shocks which turned adverse after 1982. What is perhaps more remarkable is
the volatility of these shocks. This, measured  by the standard deviation, was 11 percent in the period
1980-86  and 5 percent in the period 1987-92.  The most significant  favorable shocks were the second
oil shock (14 percent in  1980) and again the Gulf war effect in the late 1980s. On the other hand
Trinidad suffered major unfavorable  shocks in 1986 and in 1991 as a consequence  of sharp drops in
international oil prices and falling petroleum production. Mature fields were depleted and no new
discoveries  were made. Nonfactor  service effects  were not important  in Trinidad and Tobago reflecting
the limited importance  of tourism in this country. In 1990, after a seven-year  decline,  real GDP rose
by 1.5 percent.
Responses. Trinidad and Tobago used the oil largesse from both oil shocks to help
increase investments  to close to 30 percent of GDP in  1980. Much of this was in the non-tradable
goods sector leading to upward pressure on the exchange  rate. It failed to take adequate measures to
stabilize  revenues  so that when shocks  turned unfavorable  demand  collapsed, investment  shares were43
Table 17  Trinidad  and  Tobago
EXTERNAL  SHOCKS  AND  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES
(peree  df  GOP
1060  1961  1982  1063  1964  1065  1966  1967  106  196  1900  1901  100
T  dmorT,ude  -14.3  -3.4  1.3  1.7  0.1  0.2  21.1  -4.3  4.8  -3.5  -6.4  3.7  0.5
NolWerServicsEroc  0.1  0.1  40.2  -0.2  40.2  -0.1  0.6  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.0  .01  0.0
ExmlVabmke  0.2  1.7  3.3  1.1  -1.8  0.3  -0.3  40.8  -1.8  40.8  0.1  0.3  0.3
IebrsRafta  0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  .0.1  -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  .0.1  -05  -0.5
Tel4  -14.0  -1.5  4.2  2.5  -1.8  0.3  21.3  -4.7  3.2  -4.0  4.4  3.4  0.4
Addionel  btSuesIo  0.0  -0.9  -0.4  1.2  0.6  0.2  -0.2  0.9  1.0  1.5  1.3  0.6  08
TOTAL  (TOM AdeAoMl  DeOM  Se'w  )  -14.0  -2.4  3.9  3.7  -1.0  0.5  21.1  -3.8  4.2  -2.5  -5.1  4.0  1.2
Ad6orilMNetNot  E  m"  lnu  F  bg  4.3  2.4  14.2  4.2  -5.1  -3.7  15.6  .1.3  3.0  2.7  -5.9  11.8  0.5
Exportbr-umt  -2.9  -10.8  -3.2  -7.4  -4.6  -0.2  0.4  -8.5  -0.1  -2.7  1.9  1.3  -3.S
ba- oly  -4.6  4.7  -0.2  9.9  3.7  4.0  5.6  2.9  1.8  -1.3  -0.1  -7.9  44
E  xoI1ICoIIIpUsue  0.0  1.2  2.0  6.3  5.0  0.4  -0.5  0.1  -0.5  -1.2  -1.1  -1.2  0.2
TOTAL  -14.0  -2.4  3.9  3.7  -1.0  0.5  21.1  -3.8  4.2  -2.5  -5.1  4.0  1.2
a  4-2  -
A_  s  8*,  A,w99,  Sdv  Aweo  8*,
IL 
Terrmbof  Trade  1.0  10.5  -0.8  4.5  0.1  8.0
Nor E  bdSwvios  Eftd  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2
ExporatVakw  0.6  1.6  -. 4  0.8  0.1  1.4
IrlwereRab  0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.3  -0.1  0.2
Total  1.6  10.5  -1.3  4.3  0.2  6.1
Addorig Ob SeWOs  0.1  0.7  1.0  0.3  0.5  0.7
TOTAL  ITudl .Addni  DOMt  SJ.ic  1.7  10.5  -0.3  4.0  0.8  7.9
Addonel Not  Examel  Fhlrqoh  1.7  9.5  1.6  5.9  1.8  7.7
Expm1EFUImlabn  -4.1  3.9  -1.5  3.0  -2.9  3.6
nkorthlbnhlty  2.0  6.6  0.0  4.4  1.1  5.6
EtorneC  _bmfedn  2.1  2.6  -0.6  0.6  0.8  2.4
TOTAL  1.7  10.5  -0.3  4.0  0.8  7.0
Sorm  td  2
SELECTED  ECONOEC  VARtALES
19t0  1061  1962  1903  1904  1965  1966  1067  1908  1909  1990  1991  1992
GOP  GROWTH  RATE  (%I \1  6.8  5.2  1.7  -7.3  -126  -2.9  -1.7  -4.0  -4.0  -0.7  1.5  3.1  -1.6
INFLATION(%)  U2  17.5  14.3  11.6  15.2  13.3  7.6  7.7  10.8  7.8  11.4  11.1  3.8  6.6
GROSSDOOMESTICINVESTMENT(%  GofGP)3  30.6  27.9  292  25.8  24.1  16.8  21.6  19.3  13.1  16.6  12.6  13.5  11.6
NATIONALSAVINGS(%ofODP)  '4  38.3  33.8  21.7  13.1  17.5  17.4  8.6  14.5  10.6  15.2  21.2  13.0  143
FOREIGNSAVINGS(%ofGOP)  5  -7.7  -5.9  7.5  12.7  6.6  1.4  13.0  4.8  2.5  1.4  -5.6  0.5  -2.5
PUBLICSECTORBALANCE(%ofGDP)  ts  7.1  2.7  -12.4  -10.9  -0.7  -5.9  -4.9  -5.4  -7.2  -4.6  -1.3  -0.2  -2.8
REER(1960.100)  %7  100.0  105.2  118.1  140.0  160.1  167.5  115.1  107.4  108.7  100.6  101.7  102.5  99.8
FOREIGNDIRECTINVESTMENT(%fGDP)8  2.3  2.6  2.6  1.1  1.5  0.7  0.4  0.7  1.4  3.4  22  2.7  2.9
ODAFLOWS(%ofGDP)  9  0.08  -0.02  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.09  0.40  0.72  0.19  0.14  0.36  -0.03  0.17
TOTALEXT.DEBT(%ofGNP)  10  14.0  15.8  14.9  18.4  16.0  20.6  40.8  399  49.2  53.8  53.8  50.9  48.9
INTERESTJTOTALEXT.  DEBTT(%)  N11  6.6  10.8  9.3  10.8  t.0  7.5  7.4  7.9  7.6  6.3  8.5  8.5  7.4
LIFE  EXPECTANCY  112  t9  70  71
INFANT  MORTALITY  RATE  %13  31  22  15
PUBUC  EXPENDITURE  ON  EDUC.  (%  of GNP)  3 7  4 7  5.6  5.9  5  1  5  5  5.6  5.2
1  WYdd  B*  (19904)
2  Atmfi  rat of kirgot  baned  an CP. IMF.  IFSBA  frm  BESD  detebe.
3  NSMnei  euloes.  IMF  and IBRD
4  Nao  Se*Igs = Goss Domssbc  S  ig.  + Nat  Fctor IncWO  m  CuITW  Trutrs.Albd  Ber* (1994)  p. 175
S Foreg Savigs  * GMSB  Da0eeUc  Irwbnenb - Na9onel  Saings.  World  Bai  (1994)  p.175
a  ConsAlded Non-tInWlCei  Pubic  Sector  Over  Bolaics.  Wod BEt  (19948)
7  Reei  Efbule ExhwW  Ra.Pwrod  Avwre.IMF
8  WorId  Bats  (19046)
9  Ndt  dburmn  of  ODA  fmn  oL *  ODA  Lom  net  +Grts.  GrMts I  dt  coopeatio  gra.  (OECD)
10 Tati Exrml  Debt  (%  of GNP).  Wad Bon  Wod DeM  Ta.  DX.
11 Tolal  Il  Paments  Total  E  x  Debt  (%). Wold  BS.  Word  Debt  Tebls. DX.
12  LUtb  epedacI  at birth (yam)
13 PerO1  ve  brths44
cut back to as low as 13 percent in  1988, and unemployment  especially in the non-tradable  goods
sector increased sharply.  This  reflected poor  policy choices and  engendered a  general lack  of
confidence. Policy did not adjust quickly after the second oil bonanza in the early 1980s. The real
exchange rate appreciated so that it proved extremely difficult to diversify the economy, a typical
Dutch disease syndrome. Only after 1986, a series of exchange rate adjustments  combined with the
depreciation  of the U.S. dollar against other major currencies  caused a depreciation  of the Trinidad and
Tobago  dollar.
In retrospect it is evident  that it would have been more prudent to iron out some of the
peaks and valleys of oil price fluctuations.  This could lead to a more stable level of investment,  help
moderate the sharp appreciation of the real exchange rate and in turn diversify the economy and
position it for sustained  growth. There was some accumulation  of external  debt in the 1980s  when the
shocks became unfavorable. Some progress was achieved  on infant mortality. The rate dropped from
31 in 1982  to 15 in 1992.
Summarm.  Trinidad and Tobago was hit by a variety of shocks that, on average, were
favorable in  the  1970s but unfavorable in  the 1980s. These shocks were  characterized by  high
volatility. The policy response was to first stimulate investment and address some social factors.
However failure to devise an appropriate cushioning  mechanism  meant that investment levels were
subject to large (and inevitably  undesirable)  swings.  The real exchange  rate was allowed to appreciate
significantly, thereby diminishing the chances for diversifying the economy and achieving a  stable
sustainable  growth pattern. The sharp rise in wealth  due to the oil largesse  was a typical Dutch disease
phenomenon.  The wealth induced increase  in spending results in a resource shift towards non-tradables
while non-oil exports experience  a decline. When oil prices decrease the process is reversed and the
non-tradable  sectors decline and this results in employment  shifts.45
APPENDIX  2: Methodology
This appendix outlines the computational  approach of decomposing  external shocks,
estimating  their impacts on the current account and assessing  the economy's performance  response to
the external shocks. The convention in this approach is that the impact of unfavorable shocks is
registered  as a positive  value.
A. Extemal Shocks: methodology
In this paper we consider four direct shocks and one indirect. The direct shocks are
defined  as 1) Terms of Trade Effect, 2) Nonfactor  Service Effect, 3) Export Volume  Effect, 4) Interest
Rate Effect. The indirect  is called  4) Additional  Debt Service.
1) Tenms  of Trade Effect (TOT)
Import and export price effects are estimated separately  and later combined  to obtain
the total terms of trade external  shock TOTt. This represents the net effect of terms of trade variation
at time t due to import and export price changes  from time t-  I to t.
TOT, = TOTMt  -TOTXt  t = (1980,..,1992)
where  TOTM is derived  as
TOTMt = VMt (PMt - PMt1)
where VMt is the volume  and PM, is the unit price of the country's merchandise  imports  at time t. The
same  formula  applies  to the export  price  effect  TOTX,
TOTXt = VXt (PX, - PX,-,)46
where  VX, is the volume  and PX, is the unit price  of the countiy's  merchandise  exports  at time  t.
The combined  effect of TOTM and TOTX is obtained  as
TOTTt = [VMt (PMt - PMt-,)] - [VXt (PXt - PXt.1)]
which  gives the terns of trade effect at year t. One limitation  of this methodology  is that a terms  of trade
deterioration  may not necessarily  lead to adverse  impact on the balance of payments  when the volume
weight  on export  is significantly  greater  than the volume  weight  on imports.
2) Nonfactor Services  Effect (NFS)
Since tourism represents a  large share  of  the  Caribbean countries'  international
transactions,  it is important  to take into consideration  the nonfactor  services component  of the current
account in the terms of trade analysis. One problem is that there is  little if any country-specific
infonnation on the prices of nonfactor  services. The "lesser of evils" solution here adopted consists in
calculating the nonfactor services net effect using the unit price for merchandise  imports for both
receipts  and payments.  Thus,
NFS, = (NFSPU, - NFSRU,) (PM, - PM,.,)  t = (1980,..,1992)
where  NFSPU  and NFSRU are the nonfactor  service  payments  and receipts  indexes' 2 respectively,  and PM
is the unit price of the country's  merchandise  imports.
3) Global Demand: Export Volume  Effect (EVE)
The global demand shock is estimated  by looking at the quantity effect. The Export
Volume Effect indicates that the country's share of world export is  changed as  a  consequence  of
12  Where  NFSPU,  x PMK  is equal  to the  nonfactor  service  payments  in US  dollars  at time  t and  NFSRUt  x PMK  is
equal  to the  nonfactor  service  receipts  in US dollars  at time  t.47
growth/slowdown  in the world demand. EVE, is the value of exports by the country at time t  if it is
assumed  that there is no change  in price from  time t-l to t. Hence,
EVE, = VXt,, PX,,  (TXVWt - GRXVWt)  t=(1980,..,1992)
where TXVWt  is the expected  rate of growth in world  export volume  at time t, based on the previous  ten
years, and GRXVW,  is the growth  rate in world  export  from time  t-l to t.
4) Interest Rate Effect (IRF)
This measure  represents  the loss/gain  in interest  payments  at time t caused  by movements
in the international  interest  rate. A positive  IRFt,  as determined  by an increase in the international  interest
rate, means  a worsening  in the country's  obligation  or an unfavorable  shock.
IRF, = LTVIR,,  (i, - i,t-)  t=(1980,..,1992)
where i is the six-month  LIBOR on US dollar deposits  (period  average),  and LTVIRt, is the portion  of a
country's  long-term  debt at time t-l  sensitive  to changes  in international  interest rates. It is computed  by
adding  together  the share of public and publicly  guaranteed  long-term  debt  at variable  interest  rate and the
total private non-guaranteed  debt. The latter is assumed  to be interest sensitive.  (See World Bank, World
Debt Tables,  various  years).
5) Additional Debt Service  (ADSE)
Lack of adequate  domestic  adjustments  forces a country to accumulate  payment arrears
and seek additional  foreign  borrowing  to mitigate  the impact  of the external  shocks. While this practice
shifts the impact of current  shocks into the future, it places further burden on the current account in the
future through  compounding  interest liabilities.  Assuming  that additional  net external  financing  at time t-l
due to the impact  of all shocks  at that time, net of other  responses,  is ANEF,  ,, and the applicable  interest
rate is it,  the total additional  interest  payments  due ADSE  shall  be48
ADSE, = it ANEFt,
If such extraordinary  borrowing  is relied on for a long period, say j years, the cumulative  interest  impact
will  be
i  I
ADSEt+j = it+j  [ANEFt+j1 + l  rI (+i  t-k+ )ANEF,l,]
This  interest impact can  be  substantial through accumulation over time  if  neither performance
improvements  nor favorable  shocks  offset  the unfavorable  ones.
B. Performance Measures: methodology
In this analysis  four measures  of performance  responses  to external  shocks  are considered:
l)Export Expansion,  2) Import Intensity, 3) Economic  Compression,  and 4) Additional  Net External
Financing.
1) Export Expansion  (XE)
This is a measure  of the increase/decrease  in a country's export share in the international
market.  It is computed  for the merchandise  component  of the trade balance  as follows:
XE, = VX,, PXt. 1 (GRVE, - GRXVWL)  t=(1980,..,1992)
where GRVE and GRXVW are the real export growth  rates in the country  and in the world. A positive
export  expansion  measure  represents  a gain in the export share of the country  and an improvement  in its
current account, assuming  that prices had not changed  from time t-l to t. Viceversa,  a negative  export
expansion  reflects relatively  poor response  to external shocks.  This measure does not provide  a  direct
relationship  between  trade policies  and export performance.  This caveat is particularly relevant  for the49
small Caribbean islands. Since these countries' exports are mainly concentrated  in few agricultural
products,  the destructive  impact of the hurricanes  on the islands' crops is reflected  in large drops in their
export  volumes.
2) Import Intensity (MINT)
An economy  can respond  to external  shocks  by reducing  its imports  through changing  its
import  intensity  per unit of real GDP, which  is generally  captured  in the income  elasticity  of imports  0. If
imports  did not grow  in reality  as in the assumed  "normal"  case,  where a constant  import  intensity  is kept,
then the economy  induced  import substitution  or its imports  were compressed  by technical  difficulties  such
as payments problems.  Assuming  that no change in price from time t-l  to t had occurred, MINT, is
computed  as
MINTt  = VMt. 1 PMt- [e 1GDPGR&-  GRVMt]  t = (1980,..,1992)
where GDPGR,  is the real GDP growth  rate and GRVMt  is the real import  growth rate in the country at
time  t.
3) Economic  Compression (ECOM)
Assuming  that domestic  income decline  induces falls in demand for foreign goods, the
effect  of economic  compression  is computed  as
ECOM,=  VM,, PM,, [Ot(GDPT,  -GDPGRj)]  t = (1980,..,1992)
where GDPT, is the expected  trend rate, based on the previous  five years, of real growth  in the countrys
GDP at year  t, and GDPGRK  is the annual  real GDP growth  rate. With a given  elasticity  0,, imports  will be
reduced  when  economic  compression  takes  place. This in turns will  affect  the demand  for foreign  exchange.50
4) Additional Net External Fmancing  (ANEF)
The country's  external  balance  after considering  all the positive  and negative  responses  to
external shocks is filed mainly with extraordinary  financing,  namely additional borrowing and arrears
accumulation.  Here,  the effect  of the net  additional  external  financing  ANEF is measured  as
ANEF, = [(TOT,  + NFS, + EVE, + IRF, + ADSEt) - (XE, + MINT, + ECOM,)]
where  ANEF is the  ex-post  equilibrium  measure  of external  financing  required  to compensate  the difference
between  the total external  shock  and performance  response  measures.51
C. Full Data Description and Sources
1)  GDP: current  prices  in US dollars.  ANDREX, World  Bank.
2)  GDP: constant  prices  in US dollars  (1987).  ANDREX,  World  Bank.
3)  Export:  merchandise  exports  at current  prices  in US dollars.  World  Tables,  World  Bank.
4)  Import:  merchandise  imports  at current  prices  in US dollars.  World  Tables,  World  Bank.
5)  Nonfactor  services  receipts  and payments:  current  prices  in US dollars.  World  Tables,
World  Bank.
6)  Merchandise  exports  and imports  prices  in US dollars.  World  Bank.
7)  Debt at variable  rate: variable  rate LDOD in current US dollars.  DX database,  World  Bank.
8)  Interest  rate: six-month  LIBOR  on US dollar  deposits,  period  average,  percent.  BESD
IMFIFSBA,  IMF.
9)  GDI:  gross domestic  investment  in current  US dollars.  World  Bank.
10)  PSBALA:  public sector  balance  in current  US dollars.  World  Bank.
11)  PUBCONS:  government  consumption  in current  US dollars.  World  Bank.
12)  PUBSAV:  public  savings  in current  US dollars.  World  Bank.
13)  ODA:  net  disbursements  of Official  Development  Assistance  from  all sources  in current  US
dollars.  OECD.
14)  INFL:  annual  rate of inflation  based  on CPI, percent  change.  BESD IMIFSBA,  IMF.
15)  FDI: foreign  direct investments  in current  US dollars.  World  Bank.
16)  XGNFS:  exports  of goods  and nonfactor  services  in current US dollars.  World  Tables,
World  Bank.
17)  TOUR: rate of growth  in tourist  arrivals  based on tourist  arrivals  staying  24 hours  or
more excluding  ship visitors  and excursionists.  The Economist  Intelligence  Unit.
18)  BMP:  black  market  premium  defined  as the ratio of the parallel  market  to the official
exchange  rate minus 1, percent.  Parallel  market  rates, end of the period.  International
Currency  Analysis  yearbook.  Official  rates, end of the period.  IMFIFSBA,  IMF.52
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